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Communication in distributed systems often relies on useful abstractions such as channels, remote
procedure calls, and remote method invocations. The implementations of these abstractions sometimes
provide security properties, in particular through encryption. In this paper we study those security
properties, focusing on channel abstractions. We introduce a simple high-level language that includes
constructs for creating and using secure channels. The language is a variant of the join-calculus and
belongs to the same family as the pi-calculus. We show how to translate the high-level language into
a lower-level language that includes cryptographic primitives. In this translation, we map commu-
nication on secure channels to encrypted communication on public channels. We obtain a correct-
ness theorem for our translation; this theorem implies that one can reason about programs in the
high-level language without mentioning the subtle cryptographic protocols used in their lower-level
implementation. C© 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
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1. COMMUNICATION CONSTRUCTS AND SECURITY
While cryptography is useful for distributed applications and fun even for application programmers,
cryptographic manipulations by and large do not belong in application code. Ideally, application code
should not be concerned with the details of key establishment and management, but should instead
rely on abstractions and services that encapsulate cryptographic operations. In recent years, several
APIs (application program interfaces) for security have appeared, providing such abstractions and
services [10, 26, 28–30, 34, 43]. Although there are substantial differences between these APIs, they
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generally offer the promise of making application code more modular, simpler, and ultimately more
robust.
In this paper, we consider high-level abstractions that largely hide the diff culties of network security
from applications. These high-level abstractions support the pleasing illusion that all application address
spaces are on the same machine and that a centralized operating system provides security for them. In
reality, these address spaces could be spread across a network, and security could depend on several
local operating systems and on cryptographic protocols across machines. Thus, the application code
need not be concerned with the security implications of distribution.
For example, when an application requires secure communication between a client and a server, the
application code may include a call to create a secure channel [26]. The secure channel is an abstraction,
which can be implemented in a variety of ways. In the local case, the implementation can rely on a local
operating system, whereas in the distributed case it involves a network connection and a key. Similarly,
the application code may include a method invocation, which may look the same whether the method
invocation is local or remote [42–44]. Security for remote method invocations may be guaranteed by
the transport implementation, fairly transparently to the application.
Up to now, the design and implementation of abstractions for secure communication have been more
an art than a science. In particular, little is known on how to analyze programs that use these abstractions,
or on what it means to implement these abstractions correctly. We address these issues, focusing on
channel abstractions.
• We introduce a simple high-level language that includes constructs for creating and using
secure channels. The language is a variant of the join-calculus [18] and belongs to the same family
as the pi-calculus [36–38]. The properties of secure channels include, for example, protection against
eavesdropping and against replays.
• We show how to translate the high-level language into a lower-level language that includes
cryptographic primitives (like the spi-calculus [7]). In this translation, we implement communication
on secure channels by encrypted communication on public channels.
• We state and prove a soundness property for our translation. This property guarantees that one
can reason about programs in the high-level language independent of their implementation.
• Finally, we consider variants of our translation, bringing it closer to practicality. These variants
avoid encryption in cases where it is unnecessary.
Neither the details of our language nor those of our translation should be essential, and hopefully a
programmeanalogue to ours canbe carried out for other languages. The corresponding translationsmight
embody implementations with diverse concerns about performance and system structure. However, in
our experience, even slight variations in languages or in translations can lead to large complications and
sometimes to security f aws.
Our def nitions and proofs are built in a modular fashion on top of small cryptographic protocols.
In recent years there have been important advances on methods for analyzing cryptographic protocols
(e.g., [13]). We rely on some of those advances, but we are not interested in protocols in isolation. We
construct only a few protocols and show that their low-level details match the high-level def nition of
secure channels. To our knowledge, results of this kind have not previously appeared in the literature.
It would be interesting (and probably hard) to obtain analogous results for other protocols.
This paper represents the conf uence of several projects, including the development of the join-
calculus [17, 18, 20–22] and of secure network objects [43], and the application of the pi-calculus and
the spi-calculus for reasoning about security protocols [7, 14]. Those projects encountered some of the
questions treated in this paper (see Section 2.2.3). They also produced the work most closely related to
that described here, including partial encodings of encryption in the pi-calculus [7, 14]. Our translation
goes in the direction opposite to those encodings.
In the next section we describe the source language and the target language of our translation and
give an informal overview of some of the themes of the paper. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our
translation, with several variants, and in Sections 5 and 6 we study its theory and some applica-
tions of this theory. We conclude in Section 7. Appendices contain supplementary formal def nitions
and proofs of our main results; some intermediate proofs are left for an extended version of this
paper [3].
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Parts of this work appear in preliminary form in three conference papers [4–6]. A fourth conference
paper continues this work with a treatment of authentication primitives [6a].
2. FROM THE JOIN-CALCULUS TO THE SJOIN-CALCULUS
In this section, we introduce our high-level language and our low-level language. Along the way, we
motivate some of the technical ideas developed in later sections. We postpone most formal details to
later sections.
2.1. The Join-Calculus
Our high-level language is the join-calculus. This is a name-passing calculus, like the pi-calculus,
with an emphasis on distributed programming. It constitutes the core of a programming language with a
fully distributed implementation [22]. The join-calculus also draws on functional languages with pattern
matching and on object-oriented languages. More precisely, our starting point is the join-calculus as
described in [18]. This join-calculus is as expressive as the asynchronous pi-calculus, and it can be used
for writing functional and object-oriented examples rather directly.
2.1.1. Syntax and Informal Semantics
The syntax of the join-calculus assumes a countable set of namesN . We use lowercase identif ers x ,
y, foo, bar, . . . to represent the elements of N .
In the pure join-calculus, as we describe it here, names are used only as names of channels (or ports).
Each channel has an associated arity—a f xed integer size for the tuples passed on the channel.We require
that names be used consistently in processes, respecting their arities, and enforce this requirement by
adopting a type system. While there exists a rich, polymorphic type system for the join-calculus [17,
21], a simple monomorphic type system suff ces for our present purposes. We write 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 for the
type of channels that carry tuples with n components of respective types σ1, . . . , σn and restrict attention
to types of this form. We allow types to be recursively def ned (formally, using a f xpoint operator),
so we may have for example σ = 〈σ, σ 〉. We assume that each name is associated with a type (although
we usually keep this type implicit) and that there are inf nitely many names for each type. Throughout,
we consider only well-typed processes.
Furthermore, in the pure join-calculus, the set of values is def ned to be the set of names. In extensions,
names are included in a larger set of values. In any case, the contents of messages are values, and we
use letters u, v, . . . to represent values. Further, we write v˜ for a tuple v1, v2, . . . , vn .
The syntax of the join-calculus includes categories of processes, def nitions, and join-patterns. Pro-
cesses, def nitions, and join-patterns are def ned recursively in Fig. 1. The operator | has highest
precedence, so for example def D in P | P ′ means def D in (P | P ′).
P ::= processes
x〈v˜〉 message
| def D in P local def nition
| if v = v′ then P else P ′ comparison
| P | P ′ parallel composition
| 0 null process
D ::= def nitions
J 	 P reaction rule
| D ∧ D′ conjunction of def nitions
J ::= join-patterns
x〈y˜〉 message pattern
| J | J ′ join of patterns
FIG. 1. Grammar of the join-calculus.
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Intuitively, the semantics of processes is as follows.
• x〈v˜〉 sends the tuple of values v˜ on the channel named x . This message is asynchronous in the
sense that it does not require any form of handshake or acknowledgment.
• def D in P is the process P in the scope of the local def nitions given in D.
• if v = v′ then P else P ′ tests whether v = v′ and then runs the process P or the process P ′
depending on the result of the test. (This construct, sometimes called matching, is an addition to the
original syntax of the join-calculus.)
• P | P ′ is the parallel composition of the processes P and P ′.
• 0 is the null process, which does nothing.
A join-pattern is a nonempty list of message patterns, each of the form x〈y1, . . . , yn〉. The names
y1, . . . , yn are bound and should all be distinct. The name x is also bound; intuitively, it is the name of
a channel being def ned. Channels in the join-calculus are localized in the sense that their names can be
introduced only in join-patterns, like the name x . A join-pattern is much like a guard for a def nition, in
the sense that a def nition J 	 P says that the process P may run when there are messages that match the
join-pattern J . (If there are messages that match the join-pattern J several times, then as many instances
of P may run.) Next, we explain the notion of matching in a few special cases.
• Let us consider f rst the case where J is simply the join-pattern x〈y〉. The join-pattern J is
matched when a message v has been sent on x . When this happens, the message is consumed, and P is
run with the actual argument v substituted for the formal argument y. (Thus, x〈y〉 	 P is analogous to
the def nition of a function with name x , formal argument y, and body P .)
• In the case where J is the join-pattern x〈y1, . . . , ym〉, we say that J is matched when a tuple
v1, . . . , vm has been sent on x (with the same m). When this happens, the message is consumed, and P
is run, with the actual arguments v1, . . . , vm substituted for the formal arguments y1, . . . , ym .
• In the more general case where J is the join-pattern x〈y1, . . . , ym〉 | x ′〈y′1, . . . , y′m ′ 〉, we say
that J is matched when there are messages on both of the channels x and x ′, and these messages have
m and m ′ components, respectively. When this happens, the messages are consumed, and P is run, with
the actual arguments substituted for the corresponding formal arguments.
The reader may infer the full def nition of matching from these special cases; for completeness, a full
formal def nition appears in Appendix A.
In addition to def nitions of the form J 	 P , the grammar allows def nitions of the form D ∧ D′.
A def nition D ∧ D′ is simply the conjunction of the def nitions D and D′. A conjunction like x〈y〉 	
P ∧x〈z〉	 Q, where the same def ned name x appears in two conjuncts, is legal; when there is a message
x〈v〉, either P or Q may run—the choice between them is nondeterministic.
Def nitions obey lexical scoping rules. In particular, given a process def D in P , a channel name
def ned in D is recursively bound in the whole of def D in P , including D. Appendix A also contains
a precise def nition of the scoping rules.
Some variants of the pi-calculus have a primitive for replication; intuitively, the replication of a
process P behaves like the parallel composition of inf nitely many copies of P [37]. The join-calculus
does not include such a primitive, because replication can be def ned as an abbreviation,
repl P def= def κ〈 〉 	 (P | κ〈 〉) in κ〈 〉,
where κ is a name that does not occur free in P .
Many additional control and data structures can be encoded in the join-calculus, but sometimes it is
preferable to take those constructs as primitive. In the main body of this paper, we give only the informal
specif cations of the constructs that we use; Appendix A contains precise specif cations.
2.1.2. An Example
As a f rst example, we consider the process:
P def= def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉.
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Here, u and v are arbitrary values, z is the free name of a channel, x is the bound name of a channel,
and y and y′ are two other bound names that serve as formal parameters. The process P introduces the
channel x and attaches to it the def nition x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉. Thus, when a pair y, y′ appears as a message
on x , its f rst component is forwarded on z. The body of the process P is x〈u, v〉, which sends the pair
u, v on x .
Informally, wemay think of x as a secure channel. Suppose that we put P in an arbitrary (and possibly
hostile) context C[ · ]. (As usual, a context is a process with a hole; if C[ · ] is a context, then C[P] is
the result of f lling its hole with P.)
• In C[P], the context C[ · ] cannot send on the channel x def ned in P , so it cannot cause P to
forward something other than u on z.
• In C[P], the context C[ · ] cannot intercept the messages that travel on x in P , so in particular
C[ · ] has no information at all about the value of v.
As in the pi-calculus and in the spi-calculus, such security properties are guaranteed by scoping,
and they can be rephrased as equivalences between processes. Informally, we say that P1 and P2 are
equivalent processes (and write P1 ≈ P2) when no context can distinguish one from the other. For
example, the equivalence
def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉 ≈ z〈u〉
equates P to a process that simply sends u on z, and it implies that the context of P cannot cause P to
forward something other than u on z. Similarly, we may express the secrecy of v by the equivalence
def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉 ≈ def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, w〉
for all v and w. The two processes being equated are P and the result of replacing v with w in P . This
equivalence means that the observable behavior of P does not depend on the value of v, even when P
is put in an arbitrary—and possibly hostile—context. (Section 5 contains a precise def nition of ≈, as
observational equivalence.)
2.1.3. A Larger Example
We describe a larger example in some detail, both as explanation of the join-calculus and as additional
motivation for our work. Our example concerns a contest. In its simplest variant, the contest relies on
a server that creates a channel and publishes its name; the participant whose entry arrives f rst on
this channel is the winner. At the level of abstraction of the join-calculus, it is relatively simple to
understand the contest, to state its properties, and to consider variants, in great part because the join-
calculus description of the contest hides challenging aspects of distributed communication (for example,
cryptographic protection). We address some of those aspects in later sections.
For convenience in this example, we use strings as though they were primitive in the join-calculus,
writing + for string concatenation. Strings could easily be added to the join-calculus, but they can also
be encoded through standard methods.
The following context essentially def nes the contest:
C[ · ] def= def entry〈a, n〉 | open〈 〉 	 a〈n + “won”〉 | closed〈n〉
∧ entry〈a′, n′〉 | closed〈n〉 	 a′〈n + “won”〉 | closed〈n〉 in [ · ].
The state of the contest is described by placing a process in C[ · ], for example as in
C[open〈 〉 | plug〈entry〉]
and as in
C[closed〈Alice〉 | plug〈entry〉].
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The channel entry is the one on which participants should send their entries. The channel open is local
to the server; the presence of a message on this channel signif es that the contest is open. Similarly,
the channel closed serves to represent that the contest is closed. (It is common to represent local state
in this manner in process calculi.) The channel plug is free, and its only purpose is the publication of
entry. The process open〈 〉 | plug〈entry〉 emits an empty message on the channel open and emits the
name entry on the channel plug. When the server receives a f rst pair a, n on entry, it replies on a, with
the string n + “won”. Thus, a is a continuation channel that represents a return address; n is arbitrary
and represents the identity of the participant that sent the message. The server records n locally by
producing the message closed〈n〉 while consuming the message open〈 〉. Later, whenever the server
receives another pair a′, n′ on entry, it replies on a′ with the same string n + “won,” thus telling the
new participant that an entry with the name n had priority. Thus, C[open〈 〉 | plug〈entry〉] represents the
starting state of the contest while C[closed〈Alice〉 | plug〈entry〉] represents a state where Alice has won.
In this example, an attacker cannot intercept or modify the entries in the contest or the server’s replies.
For instance, an attacker cannot modify the name n of the winner and cannot learn the name n′ of a
loser. We present some of these security properties, expressing them as equivalences; they follow from
the scoping rules of the join-calculus and can be proved through standard bisimulation techniques.
• Only a participantwith access to entrymaywin the contest. The following equivalence concerns
the extreme case where in fact only one participant has access to entry:
C[open〈 〉 | entry〈a, Alice〉] ≈ C[closed〈Alice〉 | a〈Alice + “won”〉].
• The outcome of the contest cannot be affected once the contest is closed:
C[closed〈Alice〉 | plug〈entry〉] ≈ def entry〈a, n〉 	 a〈Alice + “won”〉 in plug〈entry〉.
The latter process behaves monotonously, just like the contest after closing.
• A loser remains anonymous with respect to other participants:
C[closed〈Alice〉 | plug〈entry〉 | entry〈a′, Bob〉] ≈ C[closed〈Alice〉 | plug〈entry〉 | entry〈a′, Patrick〉].
This equivalence means that the outer context cannot distinguish an entry that contains Bob and an entry
that contains Patrick. The two processes being compared are in fact equivalent to
C[closed〈Alice〉 | plug〈entry〉 | a′〈Alice + “won”〉]
which is independent of Bob and Patrick.
The contest server may spread its work over auxiliary components (proxies), as follows. Each of
the proxies makes available a distinct channel entryi for entries, forwards the f rst entry that it receives
to the server, waits for an answer, and remembers this answer so that it can immediately return it in
response to later entries. The following context describes proxy i :
Ci [ · ] def= def entryi 〈a, n〉 | openi 〈 〉 	 entry〈a, n〉 | entry〈closedi , n〉
∧ entryi 〈a′, n′〉 | closedi 〈s〉 	 a′〈s〉 | closedi 〈s〉 in [ · ].
The main difference between a proxy and the server is that, when a proxy receives its f rst entry
entryi 〈a, n〉, it cannot decide by itself whether this entry is the winning one. The proxy leaves this
decision to the server by submitting two entries with the same name n but with different return addresses.
Themessage entry〈a, n〉will lead to a direct response ona to participantn; in effect, thismessage extends
the capability to send messages on a to the server. On the other hand, the message entry〈closedi , n〉will
result in an identical response on closedi to the proxy. The proxy remembers this response, so it can
handle subsequent entries without consulting the server.
SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANNEL ABSTRACTIONS 43
Combining the contexts C[ · ] and Ci [ · ], we can assemble a system with a main server and two
proxies:
C[open〈 〉 | C1[open1〈 〉 | plug1〈entry1〉] | C2[open2〈 〉 | plug2〈entry2〉]].
This system shares the essential security properties of the system without proxies (for instance, the
anonymity of losers). The question of whether the proxies may misbehave does not arise: since we have
their code, we can verify them.
Intuitively, the main server, the proxies, and the participants may be located at different sites. A
distributed implementation of the contest may therefore rely on some amount of cryptography. Obvi-
ously, the implementation could protect the channels between the sites with cryptographic protocols.
In addition, the implementation could represent channel names as unguessable capabilities, so only the
processes that obtain a return address as the result of legitimate communication can send messages
to the address. Like other high-level programming languages, the join-calculus abstracts away these
diff cult details of distributed communication. We reconsider these details in Section 6.2.
2.2. The Sjoin-Calculus
Our low-level language is an extension of the join-calculus. This low-level language includes op-
erations that model encryption and decryption; in addition, it includes names that can be used as
keys, nonces, or other tags. We call this low-level language the sjoin-calculus (by analogy with the
spi-calculus).
It is convenient that the sjoin-calculus be an extension of the join-calculus, but it is not actually nec-
essary. We do not rely on the trivial translation from the join-calculus to the sjoin-calculus, which maps
every process to itself. The sjoin-calculus processes that our translation produces rely on cryptographic
protection for communication across machines, rather than on the abstract secure channels provided by
the join-calculus.
2.2.1. Syntax and Informal Semantics
The grammar of the sjoin-calculus extends that of the join-calculus; it is given in Fig. 2. The set of
values includes not only names but also ciphertexts of the form {v˜}v . In the ciphertext {v˜}v , the subscript
v is the encryption key, and v˜ is the cleartext. We adopt a simple, black-box model of cryptographic
operations (cf. [27]). Informally, we assume that the cleartext or the encryption key cannot be extracted
v ::= values
x name
| {v˜}v encryption
P ::= processes
x〈v˜〉 message
| def D in P local def nition
| if v = v′ then P else P ′ comparison
| decrypt v using v′ to x˜ in P else P ′ decryption
| P | P ′ parallel composition
| 0 null process
D ::= def nitions
J 	 P reaction rule
| fresh x fresh name
| keys x+, x− fresh pair of keys
| D ∧ D′ conjunction of def nitions
J ::= join-patterns
x〈y˜〉 message pattern
| J | J ′ join of patterns
FIG. 2. Grammar of the sjoin-calculus.
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from the ciphertext without prior knowledge of a corresponding decryption key, that is, of the inverse of
the encryption key. We also assume that prior knowledge of a corresponding decryption key reveals the
cleartext and that the cleartext contains suff cient redundancy so that successful decryption is evident.
Ciphertexts can be compared, as for example in the process if {v}x = {v′}x then P else P ′; this
comparison would enable a recipient of {v}x with knowledge of x and v′ to deduce whether v equals v′.
The syntax of processes includes a new decryption form. The process decrypt v using v′ to x˜ in
P else P ′ attempts to decrypt v using v′ as decryption key. If this decryption succeeds, then P runs,
with the results of the decryption substituted for x˜ ; if the decryption fails, then P ′ runs. For example, if
y+ is the name of an encryption key and y− is the name of the inverse decryption key, then the process
decrypt {z}y+ using y− to x in P else P ′
will decrypt {z}y+ using y− and will run P with z substituted for x .
The syntax of def nitions includes constructs for introducing names and pairs of keys. The construct
fresh x introduces the fresh name x . The construct keys x+, x− introduces the names of keys x+ and
x−; the key x+ is an encryption key, and x− is the inverse decryption key. Note that x+ and x− range
over ordinary names: the symbols + and − are used only conventionally, and have no formal meaning.
In general, the names x+ and x− will be different; this distinction models the separation of encryption
key and decryption key in public-key cryptosystems (e.g., [33]). However, we do not require that x+
and x− be distinct; we use keys x, x when x is a shared key (so x is its own inverse), and abbreviate
keys x, x to key x . This notation yields a concise model of shared-key cryptography as a special case
of public-key cryptography.
An arbitrary value v may be used as an encryption key, in the form {v˜}v , but an inverse for v would
exist only if v is a name introduced with the construct keys. Thus, we do not consider methods for
generating a key pair from a ciphertext, from a channel name, or from an arbitrary fresh name. Such
methods arise in practical protocols, but we do not need them in our translation of the join-calculus.
The syntax of join-patterns is exactly as in the join-calculus.
Given this context-free grammar, one can write silly expressions, for example def keys x, x in x〈y〉
where a shared key x is used as a channel. A straightforward extension of the type system of the join-
calculus excludes such expressions. This extension consists in adding a basic type BitString, with the
rules that the names introduced by the constructs fresh x and keys x+, x− are of type BitString and that
encryption and decryption operations apply only to arguments of type BitString and yield results of type
BitString.
2.2.2. An Example
Our f rst example for the sjoin-calculus continues our f rst example for the join-calculus, which
concerns the process:
P def= def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉.
When this process is implemented on a single machine, the local operating system can guarantee the
desired security properties for the channel x . On the other hand, suppose that the def nition x〈y, y′〉	z〈y〉
and the body x〈u, v〉 are located in different machines. In that case, the channel x might be implemented
by a TCP connection between the machines. However, this implementation would be subject to a variety
of attacks.
Encryption canbeused in order to thwart those attacks. In particular, the implementation of the channel
x may associate a key with x and encrypt messages on x using this key. The resulting implementation
of P might be described in the sjoin-calculus as follows:
P ′ def= def keys x+, x− ∧ a〈c〉 	 (decrypt c using x− to y, y′ in z〈y〉 else 0) in e〈a, {u, v}x+〉.
Our intent is that the expressions a〈c〉 	 (decrypt c using x− to y, y′ in z〈y〉 else 0) and e〈a, {u, v}x+〉
may be located in different machines. The name e represents a public, unprotected channel that the
process P ′ uses (like an Ethernet). Instead of transmitting u and v on a private channel x , the process
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P ′ transmits them on the public channel e, but after encryption under the key x+ and tagging with the
name a. It is the responsibility of the environment to relay {u, v}x+ on a; the environment uses a as an
address, for routing {u, v}x+ . On receipt of a message c on a, the expression
a〈c〉 	 (decrypt c using x− to y, y′ in z〈y〉 else 0)
attempts to decrypt a pair y, y′ using x− as decryption key and, in case of success, forwards the f rst
component of the pair on z.
While this process P ′ may resemble a secure distributed implementation of P , because it uses
encryption, it still has several gaps. For example, nothing prevents an attacker from replaying the
message {u, v}x+ on a. Whereas P ′ would then output u on z twice, P outputs u on z only once.
Similarly, nothing prevents an attacker from intercepting all messages on e, thus causing the absence
of any output on z. A more subtle problem is that the process P ′ permits traff c analysis while P does
not, in the sense that an attacker may notice that some communication takes place on e in P ′, while P
is perfectly silent to the outside until the output on z.
The techniques that we describe in this paper address these diff culties. We show a systematic, me-
chanical way of implementing a process such as P by translating it to a lower-level process similar to
P ′. Like P ′, the lower-level processes that we construct rely on cryptographic protection for commu-
nication across machines rather than on abstract secure channels. On the other hand, our translation is
more sophisticated than P ′ might suggest. It protects against various attacks and—at least within our
formal framework—we can prove that it is correct.
In particular, we can prove that if P1 and P2 are two equivalent processes of the join-calculus, then
their implementations are equivalent processes of the sjoin-calculus, and vice versa. As an example,
consider the join-calculus equivalence
def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉 ≈ def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, w〉
which expresses that P does not reveal v. Our results imply that the implementation of P does not
reveal v either.
In the simplest case, our translation assumes that every message may cross machine boundaries
and therefore that every message requires cryptographic protection. Our translation technique is rather
f exible, so it enables us to treat more sophisticated cases, where some communication is local to a
machine or takes place on a trusted network. In those cases, only messages that cross trust boundaries
are encrypted; the basic component of the translation is a process that operates much as a f rewall with
an encrypting tunnel (e.g., [2, 8, 12]), relaying messages from a trusted machine or a trusted network
to a public network and conversely, applying encryption and converting message formats through
appropriate marshaling and unmarshaling procedures.
2.2.3. On the Choice of the Join-Calculus and the Sjoin-Calculus
The problem of implementing communication constructs securely is not unique to the join-calculus.
This problem has arisen naturally in other settings, for example in the context of network-object sys-
tems [43] (see also [42, 44]) and in the context of the pi-calculus and the spi-calculus [7, Section 8].
While it may be possible to address the problem in the context of network-object systems, doing this
precisely seems hard because of the complexity of those systems and the lack of a formal semantics
for them. In contrast, the join-calculus and the sjoin-calculus are simple enough that we can develop a
satisfactory theory for them, yet rich enough to present interesting security issues.
Another advantage of the join-calculus as the starting point for our work is that it relies on asymmetric
(one-directional) channels, unlike the standard pi-calculus which relies on symmetric (two-directional)
channels. We did in fact attempt to use the pi-calculus, but we encountered a subtle diff culty [1].
• Consider a pi-calculus process R that creates a channel c, uses it for sending and receiving an
internal message v, and f nally sends the name c on a public channel. In the pi-calculus, a process that
receives the name c is not able to work back and read the earlier traff c on c. This property is a form of
forward secrecy [16].
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• On the other hand, a natural implementation of R would map the channel c to a shared key k.
An attacker may log messages that are transmitted on the public network and, if it ever receives k, the
attacker may decrypt earlier messages under k. Thus, the natural implementation of R does not offer
forward secrecy and may leak v.
This problem does not arise in the join-calculus because, in the join-calculus, the capability of re-
ceiving on a channel can never be transferred. Abstractly, the use of the join-calculus instead of the
pi-calculus does not entail a loss of expressiveness, since there is an encoding of the pi-calculus in
the join-calculus [18]. We can compose that encoding with our translation from the join-calculus to
the sjoin-calculus, obtaining a cryptographic implementation of the pi-calculus. However, the resulting
implementation is signif cantly more complex and ineff cient than for the join-calculus.
3. LOW-LEVEL PROTOCOLS FOR COMMUNICATION
In this section, we discuss our model of low-level communication and produce two secure protocols
that transmit a singlemessage.A third protocol appears in a conference paper [6]. Any of these protocols,
or any other protocol with the same properties, can be used in the translation of Section 4.
3.1. The Low-Level Network Model
Our informal assumptions about the network used by sjoin-calculus processes are similar to those of
Needham and Schroeder [40]:
We assume that an intruder can interpose a computer in all communication paths, and thus can alter or copy parts of
messages, replay messages, or emit false material.
We also assume that each principal has a secure environment in which to compute, such as is provided by a personal
computer or would be by a secure shared operating system.
Like Needham and Schroeder, we are not concerned about timing-analysis attacks. Timing-analysis
attacks are outside the scope of our calculi (which are asynchronous and do not include any notion of
global time).
In our model, anyone can send and receive messages of type BitString through the network interface
consisting of the public channels emit and recv. For output, a process P sends its message on emit. For
input, P sends a continuation channel κ of type 〈BitString〉 on recv; the network will then return a single
message on κ . This behavior of the network is described by the expression:
def recv〈κ〉 | emit〈m〉 	 κ〈m〉 in P.
Abstracting from this expression, we obtain the context E [ · ]:
E [ · ] def= def recv〈κ〉 | emit〈m〉 	 κ〈m〉 in [ · ].
Since calls to recv〈κ〉 retrieve messages from the network nondeterministically, processes may have
to f lter for messages that are destined for them. We rely on keys as the basis for this f ltering, with the
following def nition:
let y˜ = filter k in P def= def κ〈m〉	 decrypt m using k to y˜ in P
else emit〈m〉 | recv〈κ〉 in
recv〈κ〉.
This process picks a message m from the network and attempts to decrypt it using a key k. If the
decryption succeeds, then the process executes P with m’s contents substituted for y˜; otherwise, the
process returns m to the network and retries. This method of addressing is fairly rudimentary and
unrealistic on an Ethernet and even more on a wide-area network: every message must be broadcast
to all potential recipients, and receipt of a broadcast implies a nontrivial amount of computation for
decryption. Unfortunately, using cleartext addresses would expose us to a subtle traff c-analysis attack.
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Because of the simplicity of our network interface, injecting noise into the network in order to prevent
traff c analysis is straightforward. The process W creates the desired noise:
W def= repl (def fresh m in repl emit〈m〉).
The process W endlessly generates endlessly repeated fresh messages.
Whenever we study the implementations of join-calculus processes, we do it in the context E [ · ]
and in the presence of W, and in addition in the presence of the process plug〈emit, recv〉. This process
transmits the network-interface channels emit and recv on a public channel plug, so that any outside
process has access to them. Combining these expressions, we obtain the following context:
Env[ · ] def= E [plug〈emit, recv〉 | W | · ] .
Note that, while an intruder may intercept any message, we do not guarantee that it actually will
intercept every message. (In this we seem to differ from Needham and Schroeder.) The intruder has
access to the channels emit and recv, but cannot control their behavior. This assumption is fairly realistic
and simplif es our task. For example, the translations of the processes x〈 〉 and def y〈 〉 	 x〈 〉 in y〈 〉
should be indistinguishable, since these processes are indistinguishable according to the semantics of
the join-calculus. On the other hand, an intruder that was in charge of transporting every message could
observe a difference between x〈 〉 and def y〈 〉 	 x〈 〉 in y〈 〉 by interrupting all messages on y, then
observing whether a message on x appears anyway. There would however be no harm in guaranteeing
that an intruder can obtain a copy of every message. Formally, we could provide this guarantee by
changing the def nition of E [·], as follows:
E [ · ] def= def emit〈m〉 	 data〈m〉 | leak〈m〉∧ recv〈κ〉 | data〈m〉 	 κ〈m〉 in [ · ].
Our results would still hold with this def nition, with only minor changes.
3.2. Translation Framework
To implement the join-calculus in terms of the sjoin-calculus, we map each channel x to a key pair
x+, x−. However, we cannot simply map each message v˜ on x to a message {v˜}x+ encrypted with x+ on
emit, to be received on recv and decryptedwith x−. The resulting sjoin-calculus processwould be subject
to attacks that are not possible on the original join-calculus process. For example, an eavesdropper might
recognize a message {v˜}x+ if it already knows x+ and v˜, encodes v˜ under x+, and compares the resulting
ciphertext against the message. Adding a fresh component to the message (a confounder) would prevent
this small leak. Also, an active intruder could replay {v˜}x+ later; several common techniques can prevent
this replay attack, for example the use of timestamps.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4we present two alternativemethods for implementing amessage on the channel
x . In both cases, we map a message on x to an execution of a protocol that uses the keys x+, x− and
the channels emit and recv. Although the two protocols have signif cant differences, either is adequate
for our purposes. Both of the protocols are based on two sjoin-calculus processes:
• Ex [v˜] sends a tuple v˜ of values, using the encryption key x+.
• Rx uses the key x− to decrypt a message and forwards its contents in clear on an internal
channel x◦.
Naively, one may try the following def nitions of Ex [v˜] and Rx ,
Ex [v˜]
def= emit〈{v˜}x+〉
Rx
def= let y˜ = filter x− in x◦〈y˜〉,
where the length of the tuple y˜ in the def nition of Rx is deduced from the type of x . We refer to the
protocol that uses these def nitions as the naive protocol; as explained above, the naive protocol permits
attacks. The protocols of Sections 3.3 and 3.4 require more sophisticated def nitions of Ex [v˜] and Rx .
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Throughout, we associate three distinct names x+, x−, and x◦ with each channel name x ; both x+
and x− are of type BitString while x◦ is of type 〈BitString, . . . , BitString〉 with the same arity as x . For
every name y = x , we assume that x+, x−, and x◦ are distinct from y+, y−, and y◦ and do not appear
in the processes Ey[ · ] and Ry .
3.3. Basic Protocol
The basic protocol is an enhancement of the naive protocol in several respects:
• The emitter of a message repeats the message indef nitely, in case the message is intercepted.
• The emitter also adds a fresh component c to each message. This component serves both as
a confounder (preventing the generation and detection of two identical messages) and as a unique
identif er (for thwarting replay attacks).
• The recipient of a message extracts and records its unique identif er and drops any message
whose unique identif er has been recorded previously.
The last point implies that the recipient must maintain a data structure with unique identif ers. We
omit the details of how to program such a data structure in the sjoin-calculus. We simply write the
declaration uids t to denote the def nition of an initially empty set of unique identif ers t and write
if not tset t(c) then P for a process that atomically tests whether the unique identif er c is in t , and if not
adds c to t and then triggers the execution of P . (The “test-and-set” must be atomic, but the execution
of P need not be.)
We arrive at the following def nitions.
Ex [v˜]
def= def fresh c in repl emit〈{c, v˜}x+〉
Fx
def= let c, y˜ = filter x− in if not tset tx (c) then x◦〈y˜〉
Rx
def= def uids tx in repl Fx ,
where the length of the tuple y˜ in the def nition of Fx is deduced from the type of x . The process Fx is
a component of the recipient that attempts to receive a single message; the recipient simply replicates
such attempts and def nes a shared set of unique identif ers.
The basic protocol has a major drawback: the recipients of messages must remember the unique
identif ers of those messages for ever and in principle need unbounded memory. The session-based
protocol, presented next, avoids this drawback by relying on a challenge-response dialogue.
3.4. Session-Based Protocol
In the session-based protocol, each join-calculusmessage on a channel x ismapped to a three-message
dialogue that relies on the keys x+ and x−. In order to prevent attacks, all three messages are encrypted.
• The emitter f rst sends a request for a challenge to the recipient. The request is a new shared
key k encrypted with x+. To guard against message loss, the emitter sends this request repeatedly and
selects a single challenge to proceed with the protocol.
• When the recipient receives such a request, it returns a challenge andwaits for a single response.
The challenge is a new shared key k ′ encrypted with k.
• The actual payload data are transmitted in the f nal message. It is encrypted with k ′.
The resulting def nitions are as follows.
Ex [v˜]
def= def key k in
(repl emit〈{k}x+〉) | let k ′ = filter k in (repl emit〈{v˜}k ′ 〉)
Fx
def= let k = filter x− in
def key k ′ in ((repl emit〈{k ′}k〉) | let y˜ = filter k ′ in x◦〈y˜〉)
Rx
def= repl Fx
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The key k ′ can be regarded as a session key; the steps where the emitter sends k under x+ and the
recipient replies with k ′ under k constitute a key-establishment protocol for a session. Here the session
conveys a single useful payload, v˜. However, it would be straightforward to extend the protocol to
longer dialogues. One may also use this protocol to establish site-to-site sessions and then multiplex
channels on these sessions; this technique would save on public-key operations, but would leak some
information about the distribution of channels across sites.
Like the basic protocol, the session-based protocol has some unrealistic elements. In particular, the
session-based protocol does not include any time-outs; after producing a challenge, the challenger
waits for a response indef nitely. Moreover, the protocol produces a steady stream of encrypted traff c,
even after the payload has reached the recipient. These aspects of the protocol simplify our study, for
example saving us from coding and reasoning about acknowledgments. It would be a “simple matter
of programming” to obtain a more realistic protocol; however, it may be quite hard to reason about the
resulting design.
4. TRANSLATIONS
Section 3 describes sjoin-calculus protocols that can be used as implementations for single join-
calculus messages. Since message-passing is the fundamental computation step in the join-calculus,
these protocols are the basis for complete implementations of the join-calculus in the sjoin-calculus. In
this section we def ne two techniques for doing these implementations.
• The f rst technique is a compositional translation from the join-calculus to the sjoin-calculus.
This translation replaces every join-calculus communication step with an execution of one of our
protocols. It has a direct inductive def nition,where for example theparallel compositionof twoprocesses
is mapped to the parallel composition of their respective translations.
• The second technique places a join-calculus process in a context that f lters every communica-
tion with the environment. This context is analogous to a f rewall with an encrypting tunnel.
In Section 5, we relate these two techniques, showing that they are in a sense equivalent (Theorem 3).
Both of the techniques work equally well when based on the basic protocol of Section 3.3 or the
session-based protocol of Section 3.4.
4.1. A Translation where Every Message Is Encrypted
Our f rst technique does not make any assumptions about the distribution of the process being
translated. In principle, every message could cross machine boundaries or Intranet boundaries and
could travel on a physically insecure network. Therefore, our technique protects every message of the
source process by implementing it with a cryptographic protocol, whether the message is internal to
the process or is exchanged between the process and its environment. The security properties of the
translation do not depend on any notion of a security perimeter (of “inside” and “outside”).
4.1.1. Definition
If P is a join-calculus process, then we write [[P]] for its translation to the sjoin-calculus; we write
[[ · ]] for the translation function and def ne it inductively as follows. On processes, we def ne [[ · ]] by
[[x〈v˜〉]] def= Ex [v˜+]
[[def D in P]] def= def ∧x∈dv[D]keys x+, x− in(
def [[D]] in
∏
x∈dv[D] Rx
) | [[P]]
[[if v = v′ then P else P ′]] def= if v+ = v′+ then [[P]] else [[P ′]]
[[P | P ′]] def= [[P]] | [[P ′]]
[[0]] def= 0,
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where v˜+ is v+1 , . . . , v
+
n if v˜ is v1, . . . , vn , and where dv[D] is the set of names def ned in D and∏
x∈dv[D] Rx is the parallel composition of all processes Rx for x ∈ dv[D].
On join-patterns and def nitions, we def ne [[ · ]] by:
[[x〈y˜〉]] def= x◦〈y˜+〉
[[J | J ′]] def= [[J ]] | [[J ′]]
[[J 	 P]] def= [[J ]] 	 [[P]]
[[D ∧ D′]] def= [[D]] ∧ [[D′]].
By construction, this translation has the property that [[C[P]]] = [[C]][[[P]]] for every context C[ · ]
and process P . This property is a formal ref ection of the absence of any assumptions about distribution.
The translation yields processes that can be executed in a distributed manner without any “built-in”
security properties of channels. In [[P | P ′]], the components [[P]] and [[P ′]] may be located in different
machines. Similarly, in [[def D in P]], the components [[P]] and def [[D]] in
∏
x∈dv[D] Rx may be located
in different machines. Except for a few continuations for internal use, channels convey only encrypted
messages and encryption keys.
When x is a free name in the source process, the encryption key x+ is free in the target process. Such
free encryption keys and the network interface emit, recv are the only free names in the processes that
the translation produces (in addition to the name plug, which occurs in Env[ · ]). The initial scope of
the names x◦ and x− contains only the protocol Rx , and these names are never transmitted. Thus, the
scope of these names is purely static. In contrast, the name x+ may be included in messages and sent
outside the static scope of the def nition keys x+, x− where x+ is introduced.
4.1.2. An Example
As an example, we translate the simple process considered in Section 2.1.2. According to the
def nitions, [[def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉]] is:
def keys x+, x− in ((def x◦〈y+, y′+〉 	 Ez[y+] in Rx ) | Ex [u+, v+]).
The process obtained through this translation relies on the keys x+ and x− and on the channel x◦,
which correspond to the channel x of the original process. The subprocess Ex [u+, v+] sends the keys
u+, v+, encrypted with x+, on emit. The subprocess Rx may pick up this message through recv, decrypt
it using x−, and forward its contents on x◦. The def nition x◦〈y+, y′+〉 	 Ez[y+] implies that, if u+, v+
are received on x◦, then u+ is resent on emit, now encrypted with z+.
As stated in Section 2.1.2, the process def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉 is equivalent to the process z〈u〉.
The translation of z〈u〉 is simply Ez[u+], which sends u+ on emit encrypted with z+.
In light of this example, one may expect that the translation preserves equivalence, provided the
channels emit and recv function as expected. More precisely, one may expect that if P ≈ Q then
Env[ [[P]] ] ≈ Env[ [[Q]] ]. This implication does indeed hold; it is proved in Section 5.
4.2. A Filtering Translation
An implementation of the join-calculus that does not assume anything about distribution may be
elegant and simple, but it may also be rather wasteful: it requires encryption even for messages internal
to a protected site (a machine or a network). Next, we describe an implementation that avoids encryption
in those cases.
Unlike that of Section 4.1, the translation that we describe here is not def ned inductively. Instead, the
translation of a process P is simply P put in a suitable context. This context serves as a wrapper or f lter.
It does not disturbmessages internal to P . It does, however, catchmessages that cross the boundary of P ,
adding or removing encryption, and translating contents (marshaling and unmarshaling). For example,
a message that would leave P on a channel x gets turned into a BitString message encrypted with the
key x+; if the message contains the channel name v, then v gets replaced with the key v+. Conversely,
when a message arrives at the f lter encrypted with a key y+ and the f lter has the key y−, the contents
of the message are translated and relayed on a channel y.
This f lter resembles a f rewall with an encrypting tunnel, so we sometimes refer to it as a f rewall (a
little abusively, perhaps). From the programmer’s point of view, this f lter serves as a run-time system
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for distributed communication that takes care of encryption and decryption and of marshaling and
unmarshaling (e.g., [43]).
4.2.1. Data Structures
Our f rewall keeps track of the correspondence between encryption keys on the outside and channel
names on the inside of a process. This correspondence is recorded in association tables. These association
tables are auxiliary data structures that can be encoded in the join-calculus and a fortiori in the sjoin-
calculus. We omit their encoding and describe only their interface.
• The def nition assoc S, t(x)= T, t ′(x+)= T ′ introduces an association table with content S.
This def nition binds two lookup functions t and t ′ and attaches the processes T and T ′ to them.
• The content S is a f nite set of pairs (x, v) where x is a channel name and v is a value of type
BitString.
• In a def nition assoc S, t(x) = T, t ′(x+)= T ′ of an association table, the processes T and T ′
are both of the form def D in Q | enter x, x+. The process enter x, x+, which appears once in T and
once in T ′, has the role of entering the association between x and x+ in the table, adding the pair (x, x+)
to S. In T , x+ is def ned in D while x is free. In T ′, conversely, x is def ned in D while x+ is free.
• In the scope of a def nition assoc S, t(x)= T, t ′(x+)= T ′, the process let x+ = t(v) in P looks
for a key associated with v in S. If one is found, then P is executed with the key substituted for x+.
Otherwise, the process T attached to t is executed; it creates a key and enters the association between
v and this key. In parallel, P is executed with the key substituted for x+.
• Similarly, the process let x = t ′(v′) in P ′ looks for a channel name associated with v′ in S and,
if one is not found, creates a channel name. In any case P ′ is executed with a channel name associated
with v′ substituted for x .
4.2.2. The Dynamics of Filtering
Because of name mobility, the interface between a process and its environment can evolve as they
exchange new names in messages. To capture this dynamic aspect of communication, we draw on
techniques developed in earlier work on the join-calculus [18]: we use mutually recursive def nitions
that f lter all messages and unfold new f lters for their arguments. Some complications arise because the
join-calculus thatwe use here features several types of channels.Accordingly,wemaintain a key-channel
association table for every type that may traverse the f rewall.
Assume that S is a f nite set of names and that is a set of channel types that contains all the types of
names in S and that is closed under decomposition (that is, if 〈σ1, . . . , σn〉 ∈  then σ1, . . . , σn ∈ ).
For every σ ∈ , let Sσ be the set of names of type σ in S.
The def nition D(S) creates an association table for every type σ in , with an entry for each name
in Sσ . This def nition is given next, top-down.
D(S)
def=
∧
σ∈
assoc {(x, x+) | x ∈ Sσ }, tσ (x) = Tσ , t ′σ (x+) = T ′σ
Tσ
def= def Dσ, x◦	x ∧ keys x+, x− in Rx | enter x, x+
T ′σ
def= def Dσ, x	Ex in enter x, x+
D〈σ1,...,σn〉, x◦	x
def=
x◦〈y+1 , . . . , y+n 〉	
let y1 = t ′σ1 (y+1 ) in . . . let yn = t ′σn (y+n ) in
x〈y1, . . . , yn〉
D〈σ1,...,σn〉, x	Ex
def=
x〈y1, . . . , yn〉	
let y+1 = tσ1 (y1) in . . . let y+n = tσn (yn) in
Ex [y+1 , . . . , y+n ]
We may write Dx	Ex and Dx◦	x for Dσ, x	Ex and Dσ, x◦	x , respectively, when σ is unimportant or clear
from context.
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In our construction of a f rewall in Section 4.2.3, we use a def nition D(S) for intercepting and
forwarding messages, performing conversions between channel names and keys, encrypting and de-
crypting, and unfolding new f lters for processing future messages. We explain D(S) further by dis-
tinguishing two ways in which entries appear in association tables at the f rewall:
• Suppose that the entry (x, x+) has been registered in an association table at the f rewall from
the inside, by a call to tσ (x). This call would have allocated a new pair of keys x+, x−, unfolded a
def nition Dσ, x◦	x , and forked a process Rx .
Whenever a process outside the f rewall knows the key x+ and produces a message on x by running
the process Ex [y+1 , . . . , y+n ] on the public network, the process Rx f rst performs a decryption with x−
and then delivers the message x◦〈y+1 , . . . , y+n 〉 to a second stage.
In this second stage, the effect of receiving y+1 , . . . , y
+
n on x
◦ is described in Dσ, x◦	x . According
to Dσ, x◦	x , the encryption keys received (y+1 , . . . , y+n ) are mapped to channel names (y1, . . . , yn). For
this purpose, the f rewall performs a lookup for every key y+i in the association table corresponding
to the expected type for yi . Once every name yi has been obtained, the plain message x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 is
delivered to some def nition inside the f rewall.
In case a key y+i is not present in the corresponding association table, the allocator T ′σi registers a
fresh name yi so that future messages sent on yi inside the f rewall are encrypted and forwarded outside
using the key y+i . Note that, as a result of this method, the same key y
+
i may eventually appear in the
association tables for several different types and be associated with a different channel name in each of
these tables.
• In the other direction, suppose that the entry (x, x+) has been registered in an association table
at the f rewall from the outside, by a call to t ′σ (x
+). This call would have given rise to a def nition
Dσ, x	Ex that binds x .
Whenever a message x〈y1, . . . , yn〉 is emitted within the f rewall, f rst every channel name yi is
replaced with an encryption key y+i (possibly extending the association tables if these names are
crossing the f rewall for the f rst time), then the resulting contents are encrypted by the sending process
Ex [y+1 , . . . , y+n ].
The def nition of D(S) extends smoothly to variants of the join-calculus with basic types (such as
the types of integers and strings). Instead of including an association table in D(S) for each basic type
σ , we assume a given bijective function tσ for marshaling values from σ to BitString and its inverse t ′σ
for unmarshaling values from BitString to σ .
4.2.3. Putting a Process behind a Firewall
Next, we show how to construct a f rewall for a process. The f rewall will depend only on the output
interface of the process, that is, on the free names of the process. We bind all those free names in
the f rewall and register them associating each of them with a free encryption key. When the process
exports other names, as it runs, the f rewall evolves too. Thus, we guarantee that the f rewall intercepts
every message between the process and its environment. We put a process P behind a f rewall sim-
ply by placing it in a context FS[ · ], where S includes all the free names of P . The context FS[ · ] is
def ned by
FS[P] def= def D(S) ∧
∧
x∈S
Dx	Ex in P,
where is the smallest set of types that contains the types of all the names in S and that is closed under
decomposition. Every well-typed join-calculus process uses only a f nite number of types [17], so  is
f nite, so the context FS[ · ] is well def ned. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the lookup
functions tσ , t ′σ are not free in P .
For each name x ∈ S of type σ , the f rewall of FS[P] has an entry (x, x+) in the table for σ and
a def nition Dx	Ex . This def nition takes outputs from P on x , marshals them, and relays them using
encryption with the key x+. In the course of computation, though, P may export the names of channels
def ned in P , for input. Accordingly, it is sometimes useful to describe the state of a f rewall that exports
encryption keys that correspond to those names.
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We therefore generalize the def nition of the f rewall context as follows. Given a process P def= def
D in Q, assume that S and X are two f nite disjoint sets of names such that S includes all the free names
of P and X includes only names def ned in D. We let
F XS [D, Q] def= def D(X ∪ S) ∧
∧
x∈X
Dx◦	x ∧
∧
x∈S
Dx	Ex ∧ D in Q |
∏
x∈X
Rx ,
where  is the smallest set of types that contains the types of all the names in X ∪ S and that is closed
under decomposition.
Intuitively, S is the output interface of P while X is its input interface. This input interface consists
of names in D that have been exported. For every such name x , the f rewall has an entry (x, x+) in
an association table and a def nition Dx	Ex . In addition, the f rewall forks a process Rx for receiving
messages encrypted with x+.
The f rewall is well typed and provides a well-typed interface for the process that it encloses. Its
only interface with the environment consists of the names emit and recv and of values of type BitString.
It does not make any further assumptions about the types used by the environment. The environment
may even overload one of its keys, using it as though it represented several channels of different types
and causing it to appear in several association tables at the f rewall, without a security compromise.
This property of the f rewall is essential: security should not depend on a typing assumption about the
environment, since the environment could well violate such an assumption.
The f rewall is intended for use in the environment Env[ · ], in particular in the form
Env[FS[P] ].
The next section relates f rewalls to the compositional translation of Section 4.1 by establishing the
equivalence
Env[FS[P] ] ≈ Env[ [[P]] ],
where S includes all the free names of P .
4.2.4. An Example
We continue the f rst example (of Section 2.1.2), placing the process
def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉
within a f rewall. We write σ and τ for the respective types of the free names u and v, so the free name
z has the type 〈σ 〉. By putting the process in a f rewall context, we obtain:
def D{σ,τ,〈σ 〉}({u, v, z}) ∧ Du	Eu ∧ Dv	Ev ∧ Dz	Ez in
def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉.
In this process, each of three association tables contains a single pair ((u, u+) for type σ , (v, v+) for
type τ , and (z, z+) for type 〈σ 〉), and the f rewall has three output f lters Du	Eu , Dv	Ev , and Dz	Ez for
the names u, v, and z. The process can take a local step that releases the message z〈u〉. The f rewall
will intercept this message, fetch the name u+ from the table for type σ , and run the process Ez[u+]. In
three reduction steps, we obtain:
def D{σ,τ,〈σ 〉} ∧ Du	Eu ∧ Dv	Ev ∧ Dz	Ez in
Ez[u+] | def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in 0.
This process will behave like Ez[u+], because both the f rewall and the process def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in 0
are inert.
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5. SOUNDNESS RESULTS
In this section, we present our main soundness results. First, we def ne the relation of equivalence on
processes, mentioned informally in the other sections. Then, we state our main theorems and discuss
their signif cance.
Appendix A contains additional formal details. It contains, in particular, scoping rules and opera-
tional semantics, including the def nition of binary relations≡ and→ on processes. Intuitively, P ≡ Q
means that P and Q are structurally equivalent (almost syntactically equivalent, modulo some rear-
rangements), and P → Q means that P may perform one step of internal computation and then behave
as Q. Appendix B contains auxiliary results and proofs.
5.1. Observational Equivalence and Other Relations
We use a form of observational equivalence as a basis for reasoning about processes. The concept
of observational equivalence goes back to Milner’s work on CCS [35]; more specif cally, we adopt a
reduction-based semantics, as for example in the work of Honda and Yoshida [24] (see also [19]). Next,
we def ne observational equivalence and other relations; all the def nitions are fairly standard.
Evaluation contexts are the contexts generated by the grammar
C[ · ] ::= [ · ] | P | C[ · ] | def D in C[ · ],
where P ranges over processes and D over def nitions of the calculus under consideration (here, the
join-calculus or the sjoin-calculus). Every evaluation context is structurally equivalent to one of the form
P | [ · ] or def D in P | [ · ]. Further, P can be restricted to the form P1 | · · · | Pn | [ · ], for some n ≥ 0,
where none of P1, . . . , Pn is a def nition or a parallel composition. In analyzing evaluation contexts,
we often consider only contexts of the form def D in P | [ · ]; the case P | [ · ] is analogous but simpler.
For every process P and name x , we def ne the assertions P ↓x (“P has strong barb x”) and P ⇓x
(“P has barb x”) as
P ↓x def= ∃C[ · ], v˜. P ≡ C[x〈v˜〉] with C[ · ] an evaluation context that does not bind x
P ⇓x def= ∃P ′. P →∗ P ′ ∧ P ′ ↓x,
where →∗ is the ref exive and transitive closure of →. That is, P ↓x holds if P may output on x
immediately, and P ⇓x holds if P may output on x either immediately or after some internal reductions.
Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R on processes that meets the
following requirements:
1. if P R Q and P ⇓x then Q ⇓x, for every name x ;
2. R is closed by application of evaluation contexts; that is, for all evaluation contexts C[ · ], if
P R Q then C[P] R C[Q];
3. R is a weak bisimulation; that is, for all P and Q we have:
P R Q and P → P ′ implies ∃Q′. Q →∗ Q′ and P ′ R Q′.
May-testing equivalence (may) is the largest symmetric relation that meets only requirements 1 and 2.
May-testing equivalence is coarser than observational equivalence in that it does not take into account
the branching structure of processes.
Wealsomakeuse of an auxiliary expansion relation [41]which is f ner than observational equivalence:
barbed expansion ( ) is the largest relation R such that R and its converse R−1 meet requirements
1, 2, 3, and such thatR meets the asymmetric requirement
P R Q and P → P ′ implies ∃Q′. Q →= Q′ and P ′ R Q′.
where →= is the ref exive closure of →. We write  for the converse of  .
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The def nitions above are parametric in the reduction relation → and in the grammar of evaluation
contexts. Here, they def ne relations for both the join-calculus and the sjoin-calculus. We refer to earlier
papers (e.g., [17–19]) for further discussion of these def nitions.
5.2. Correctness of the Low-Level Protocols for Communication
We f rst def ne a correctness property for protocols that transmit a single message, such as those
of Section 3. Our translations are based on such protocols, and this correctness property suff ces as a
hypothesis in results about the translations. (An even weaker property may suff ce, but its def nition
would probably be fairly complex.) Compared to common specif cations of cryptographic protocols,
our correctness property is rather abstract: it concerns the intended effects of a protocol rather than the
specif cs of its implementation.
In the following def nition, a protocol is a pair (Rx , Ex [ · ]) consisting of a process for receiving and
one for sending, parameterized by a channel name x . The def nition relies on a set R of derivatives of
the receiving process Rx . This set represents the different states of a receiver after interaction with its
context. The def nition also relies on the context
Envx± [ · ] def= Env[ def keys x+, x− in plug′〈x+〉 | [ · ] ].
This context publishes the encryption key x+ through the channel plug’, but does not publish the
decryption key x−. Although Envx± [ · ] does not def ne x◦, we usually nest it in other contexts that
def ne x◦ in appropriate ways.
DEFINITION 1. The protocol (Rx , Ex [ · ]) is correct if there is a set of processes R that satisf es the
following conditions.
1. Rx ∈ R.
2. The free names of Ex [ · ] are at most emit, recv, and names of type BitString. For every R ∈ R,
the free names of R are at most emit, recv, x◦, and names of type BitString.
3. For every R ∈ R, it is not the case that R ↓emit or that R ↓x◦ .
4. For every R ∈ R, for every tuple v˜ of values of type BitString whose length matches the arity
of x , if x− does not occur in v˜, then
Envx± [ R | Ex [v˜] ]  Envx± [ R | x◦〈v˜〉 ] .
5. For every value v, if x+ and x− do not occur in v and
Envx± [Rx | emit〈v〉] → P
then
P  Envx± [Rx | emit〈v〉].
6. For every R ∈ R, if x− does not occur in v and
Envx± [R | emit〈v〉]→ P
then
P  Envx± [R′ | Q]
for some R′ ∈ R and some process Q such that x− does not occur in Q.
Condition 1 says that the initial receiving process, Rx , is in R.
Condition 2 restricts the free names in use in the protocol. The sending process Ex [ · ] may have access
to the network-interface channels (emit and recv). The receiving process Rx and all other processes in R
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may have access to those channels and also to x◦. The requirement that x◦ does not occur free in Ex [ · ]
rules out degenerate protocols where the sending process does the work of the receiving process, like
(0, x◦〈·〉). In addition to emit, recv, and x◦, the protocol may rely on names of type BitString. Intuitively,
Condition 2 implies that communication from Ex [ · ] to Rx is limited to messages of types BitString
and 〈BitString〉 on the channels emit and recv. Therefore, the protocol can be directly implemented
over an ordinary network like that represented by the channels emit and recv, without any additional
assumptions about physical security or out-of-band communication.
Condition 3 says that every process R ∈ R is passive, in the sense that it never sends messages on
emit or x◦ on its own. This condition still allows R to send messages on recv.
Condition 4 says that the protocol transmits messages reliably and secretly when an instance of the
sending process Ex [ · ] is put in parallel with the receiving process Rx or any other process R ∈ R. Using
the expansion relation, this condition compares R | Ex [v˜] with R | x◦〈v˜〉. The former process has Ex [v˜]
as a component, while in the latter Ex [v˜] is replaced with its intended outcome, namely x◦〈v˜〉 (with no
other visible effect). In both processes we have the same component R; this condition implies that the
state of the receiving process remains essentially unchanged as long as it interacts with regular sending
processes. Condition 4 rules out insecure protocols that leak information in the course of transmitting a
message; many obviously insecure protocols fall into this category. In particular, the naive protocol of
Section 3 violates Condition 4 on several counts. For example, a context that intercepts themessage from
Ex [v˜] and listens on x◦ can differentiate Envx± [R | Ex [v˜]] and Envx± [R | x◦〈v˜〉]. Furthermore, a context
that interacts with Envx± [ R | Ex [v˜] ] may be able to guess v˜; then conf rm the guess by computing
{v˜}x+ and comparing {v˜}x+ with the message from Ex [v˜]. In contrast, the context cannot obtain the
same information in interaction with Envx± [R | x◦〈v˜〉].
The last two conditions (5 and 6) describe interactions between the receiving process and the context.
These conditions are needed in addition to Condition 4 because the context might not behave as a regular
sending process. Since the context may communicate with the receiving process only through messages
of the form emit〈v〉, the last two conditions describe the behavior of the receiving process in reaction
to such a message. The conditions concern two cases, distinguished by whether the encryption key x+
occurs in v.
Condition 5 describes the behavior of Rx in a context that does not have access to the keys x+ or x−.
Intuitively, this behavior is that exhibited when the attacker has not yet been given x+, so the receiving
process should remain essentially invisible. For every reduction Envx± [R | emit〈v〉]→ P , expansion
relates the outcome P to the initial state Envx± [R | emit〈v〉]. Thus, if Rx takes a message from the
network and the message is unrelated to x+, x−, then Rx must resend the message. Similarly, if Rx
becomes a process R by internal reductions (so P equals Envx± [R | emit〈v〉]), then it must be possible
to go back from R to Rx obtaining that Envx± [R | emit〈v〉] Envx± [Rx | emit〈v〉].
For example,Condition 5 excludes a protocolwhere Rx “swallows” allmessages that are not encrypted
under x+, thus revealing its presence. It also excludes a protocolwhere Rx swallowsmessages selectively,
possibly revealing sensitive information.
Condition 6 describes the behavior of a receiving process R ∈ R in a context that has access to
the encryption key x+ but not to the decryption key x−. Intuitively, this behavior corresponds to the
case where the attacker has been given the encryption key and can thus cause messages on x◦; in
this situation, the attacker should still not interfere with messages from other senders. The reduction
Envx± [ R | emit〈v〉 ] → P may change the state of the receiving process, for example by completing a
run of the protocol and relaying a message on x◦. The process P cannot, however, be arbitrary: it must
be in the expansion relation with a process that includes a new receiving process R′ ∈ R in place of R,
in parallel with a process Q in place of emit〈v〉. The process Q may contain emissions on x◦ and emit;
it typically consists of parts of residues of R that do not need the decryption key x− any more.
For example, Condition 6 excludes an insecure variant of a correct protocol where the receiving
process is modif ed as follows. In answer to messages of a form that a regular sending process never
creates (for example, {c, c, c}x+ for the basic protocol), the receiving process emits a fresh value u;
the receiving process works correctly for input tuples that do not contain u, but leaks input tuples that
contain u. A f aw appears only after the creation of u, which regular sending processes never cause.
Thus, all other conditions can be met. Nonetheless, an attacker may obtain u, pass u to some third party,
and harvest secrets later on if the third party includes u in messages to the receiving process. This variant
violates Condition 6: consider the reduction Envx± [R | emit〈{v˜}x+〉] → P that will cause the creation
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of u; then Condition 6 requires that P  Envx± [R′ | Q] for some R′ ∈ R, while no such R′ can satisfy
all the other conditions.
THEOREM 1. Both the basic protocol and the session-based protocol are correct.
The proof of this theorem, which is presented in Appendix B, relies crucially on the use of noise in
our def nition of the network. For the basic protocol, the set R is indexed by the content of the table of
unique identif ers. For the session-based protocol, the set R is simply the singleton {Rx }.
For the rest of this section, we consider an arbitrary but f xed correct protocol. In particular, whenever
we refer to a translation, we mean a translation built on this protocol.
5.3. Main Results
Intuitively, we may think of [[P]] and FS[P] as implementations of P . Technically, this intuition is
not quite satisfactory, particularly if we adopt a standard concept of implementation according to which
Q implements P if and only if every possible behavior of Q is a possible behavior of P (e.g., [25]).
1. This intuition is not accurate, because [[P]] and FS[P] may behave in ways in which P could
not behave. In particular, [[P]] and FS[P] typically send messages on the channels emit and recv even
when these names are not present in P .
2. This intuition is not quite suff cient, because it does not imply that the proposed implementation
shares the security properties of P: the implementation relation need not preserve those properties
(e.g., [31, 32]).
Security properties can sometimes be phrased as equivalences (as in Section 2.1), so the second objection
suggests that we phrase our result in terms of equivalences rather than in terms of implementation
relations. The f rst objection suggests that we should take the context Env[ · ] into account and that we
should not directly equate P with [[P]] and FS[P].
With these insights, we arrive at the following theorem about the compositional translation of
Section 4.1. In programming language terminology, this theorem is a full-abstraction result. From
a security perspective, it implies that low-level attackers in the sjoin-calculus have the same power as
higher-level attackers in the join-calculus (see Section 5.4).
THEOREM 2. The compositional translation is fully abstract, up to observational equivalence: for
all join-calculus processes P and Q,
P ≈ Q if and only if Env[ [[P]] ] ≈ Env[ [[Q]] ].
The statement of this theorem may seem ambiguous, because P ≈ Q can be read as the equivalence
of P and Q either as join-calculus processes or as sjoin-calculus processes. However, these two readings
coincide (see Appendix A.3).
An extreme special case is that where a process P never communicates with its context, so P ≈ 0. In
this case we obtain Env[ [[P]] ] ≈ Env[ [[0]] ]; that is, Env[ [[P]] ] ≈ Env[ 0 ]. Wemay infer (informally)
that a low-level attacker cannot tell whether the implementation of P is running.Another simple example
is that of the processes def x〈y, y′〉 	 z〈y〉 in x〈u, v〉 and z〈u〉, as discussed in Sections 2.1.2 and 4.1.2.
The next theorem says that the f ltering translation of Section 4.2 is equivalent to the compositional
translation.
THEOREM 3. The filtering translation is equivalent to the compositional translation, up to observa-
tional equivalence: for every join-calculus process P and every set of names S that includes all the free
names of P,
Env[ [[P]] ] ≈ Env[FS[P] ].
This theorem implies that the f ltering translation is fully abstract too. In this case, however, the “only
if” direction of full abstraction is rather trivial, as it follows from basic congruence properties.
In general, full-abstraction results with respect to a particular equivalence relation do not imply full-
abstraction results for coarser equivalences. However, we have full-abstraction results for a large class
of equivalences.
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THEOREM 4. Let R be a transitive relation on sjoin-calculus processes that is closed by application
of evaluation contexts and such that ≈ ⊆ R. For all join-calculus processes P and Q,
P R Q if and only if Env[ [[P]] ] R Env[ [[Q]] ].
In particular, may-testing equivalence (may) is coarser than observational equivalence and is closed
by application of evaluation contexts. (It is perhaps the most important relation that satisf es these
conditions, becauseof its correspondencewith safety properties [15].)Therefore,weobtain, for example:
P may Q if and only if Env[ [[P]] ] may Env[ [[Q]] ].
Theorem 3 immediately implies that analogous results hold for the f ltering translation.
5.4. Discussion
The “upward” direction of our full-abstraction results says that two join-calculus processes are
equivalent only if their implementations in the sjoin-calculus are equivalent. This property is important
because it means that our translations do not identify “too many” join-calculus processes or even—
trivially—all join-calculus processes.
For security, however, full abstraction is interesting mainly in the “downward” direction [1]: if two
join-calculus processes are equivalent, then their implementations in the sjoin-calculus are equivalent
too. Hence, it is sound to reason about a join-calculus process and to infer properties of its sjoin-
calculus implementation, without explicitly considering the low-level communication mechanisms of
the implementation and without concern for low-level attacks on those communication mechanisms.
For example, suppose that we have written a join-calculus process that publishes a communication
channel (like the contest server of Section 2.1.3 publishes entry). We can assess the consequences of this
publication within the high-level calculus, considering only the high-level contexts in which the process
may be used. Those consequences may be undesirable—our results do not exclude that possibility. Our
results do imply that we need not think about lower-level details of how the channel is represented by
keys or about low-level attacks that this representation might permit.
More precisely, suppose that x is a channel name free in P , that y is bound in P , and that P includes y
in amessage on x . The implementation of P will relay a key y+ instead of y to the outside. Perhaps y was
intended for internal use only, somessages on y may be trusted in P somehow (wrongly). Then an attack
against the implementation may be able to exploit the knowledge of y+, since the implementation will
decrypt anymessage encrypted with y+ and relay its contents internally. In this situation, our techniques
do not help, but they do not hurt either (as Theorem 2 indicates). The translations could be supplemented
with restrictions for auditing or preventing the escape of keys like y+, at the cost of some transparency.
We should mention, as a caveat, that the low-level attacks that we can rule out are only those that
can be expressed in the sjoin-calculus. Although the sjoin-calculus is rather rich, it does have some
limitations. For example, the sjoin-calculus represents key generation and encryption rather abstractly,
not showing the details of particular algorithms for these purposes; therefore, the shortcomings or
peculiarities of those algorithms are beyond the scope of our results. Moreover, the join-calculus and
the sjoin-calculus do not include any notion of real time or of network bandwidth; therefore, they exclude
from consideration any attack that depends on observing real-time behavior or bandwidth usage.
Our full-abstraction results are rather robust, as they hold for a range of equivalence relations on
processes, including observational equivalence and may-testing equivalence, and also intermediate
equivalences that incorporate notions of fairness, such as fair-testing equivalence [11, 39].Much as in the
spi-calculus, observational equivalence can often be provedmore directly thanmay-testing equivalence.
While may-testing equivalence probably has a more intuitive meaning, our results for observational
equivalence demonstrate that our translations preserve even the branching structure of processes.
The strength of our results has a price: in order to obtain these results, we have adopted a sophisticated
and somewhat expensive implementation strategy. For example, our results would not hold if we did not
protect against traff c-analysis attacks. For this protection, we rely on the use of noise. Since in practice
noise consumes network bandwidth, it would be attractive to omit the noise; one would still hope to
prove a correctness result—at least a weak one. Formulating and proving such results is an intriguing
subject for future research.
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6. APPLICATIONS
Since the compositional translation is (obviously) compositional, Theorem 3 implies that the f ltering
translation is compositional too. Building on this observation, we address issues of distribution by
analyzing systems with multiple f rewalls. We also illustrate the use of our results in an example.
6.1. Multiple Firewalls and Their Placement
The join-calculus can be ref ned to account for computations distributed over several sites [20]. For
our purposes, distribution simply means a fairly arbitrary partition of processes and def nitions. Thus,
when we write
def D in P | Q
we may intend that the different parts of this expression (D, P , Q) be executed at several sites inter-
connected by a public network—although we do not rely on any special syntax to indicate this in the
join-calculus. This section shows that, following our method, we can wrap a f rewall around the code for
each site, making the site boundaries explicit. Each f rewall communicates with its outside (including
the f rewalls for other sites) through a poor interface: the public network, where traff c is unprotected
and limited to type BitString. Moreover, we do not assume a particular application protocol for D, P ,
and Q. Nevertheless, the distribution across sites preserves security properties.
Section 4.2.3 shows how to enclose a single process within a f rewall. More generally, f rewalls can
be placed around any part of a composite system. For example, we can write
Env[FS[P] |FS[Q] ]
representing two separate processes P and Q, each with its own f rewall, on a public network modeled
as the environment Env[ · ]. Each f rewall maintains its own association tables; the two f rewalls may
map an encryption key to different local names of channels. We have the following compositionality
property:
THEOREM 5. For all join-calculus processes P and Q, and every finite set of names S that includes
all the free names of P and Q,
Env[FS[P | Q] ] ≈ Env[FS[P] |FS[Q] ].
This property means that we can partition the process P | Q into two components P and Q, locate
these components at different sites with their own f rewalls, let them communicate with each other and
with the environment through the f rewalls, and be sure that the environment will not be able to detect
any difference with the situation where P | Q is at a single site with one f rewall.
Another compositionality property deals with the distribution of both processes and def nitions over
any number of sites; it is analogous butmore complex andmore general. In the statement of this property,
we rely on the following notation, which extends the notation Envx± [ · ] replacing x with a f nite set of
names X :
EnvX± [ · ] def= Env
[
def
∧
x∈X
keys x+, x− in [ · ]
]
.
THEOREM 6. Let S be a finite set of names and let P be a join-calculus process of the form def∧n
i=1 Di in
∏n
i=1 Qi , where S includes all the free names of P and where the sets dv[Di ] and S
are pairwise disjoint. For i, j ≤ n, we define the sets of names X ji = dv[Di ] ∩ (fv[D j ] ∪ fv[Q j ]),
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Xi =
⋃
j =i X
j
i , X j =
⋃
i = j X
j
i , and X =
⊎n
i=1 Xi . We have the equivalence
Env[FS[P] ] ≈ EnvX±
[
n∏
i=1
F XiXi ∪S[Di , Qi ]
]
.
This property means that we can partition the process P into n components and still guarantee that
communication on channels def ned in P proceeds as though all the components were at the same site.
Each component consists of a def nition Di and a process Qi behind a f rewall. Communication between
Di and Qi is local; it does not involve any f rewall. The names in X ji represent the input interface of
component i made available to component j . Therefore, the names in Xi represent the input interface of
component i , and the names in Xi unionmulti S represent the output interface of component i . Finally, the set X
contains all the names that are local to P but shared between at least two components. For each name
x ∈ X , the context EnvX± [ · ] binds a key pair x+, x−. The f rewalls for the n sites can communicate
with one another using x+, x− but neither x+ nor x− is available to the outside initially.
When Qi sends a message on a channel x ∈ Xij , the message traverses the i th and j th f rewalls,
undergoing f rst encryption with x+ and then decryption with x−. If the message contains another
name y ∈ X ji ∪ Xij ∪ S, this name is converted to a key y+ and back to a channel name as it traverses
the f rewalls. If the message contains a name z that Qi is exporting for the f rst time (for example,
z ∈ dv[Di ]\Xi ), a new key z+ appears and is successively recorded at both f rewalls; this key is
associatedwith z at the i th f rewall andwith a newname at the j th f rewall. The result is the establishment
of a secure communication path in the reverse direction, from component j back to component i . As
other channel names are exchanged, the components keep communicating just as they would do if they
were at the same site. The f rewalls are transparent, and they extend transparently whenever a new
channel name traverses them.
Intuitively, there is no requirement that all the sites trust one another, and in fact some of them may
represent incompetent or malicious participants, possibly collaborating with an outside attacker. Our
results apply to this situation without change.
6.2. An Example
In order to illustrate the use of our method, we revisit the example of Section 2.1.3 and describe two
implementations of the contest server def ned there.
First, we discuss the effect of wrapping a f rewall around the contest server in its initial state, which
is described by the process
C[open〈 〉 | plug〈entry〉].
This process has a single free name, plug, but its type is quite complicated. We explain this type bottom-
up, writing String for the basic type of strings. The type of a and closed is 〈String〉, so the type of entry
is 〈〈String〉, String〉 and the type of plug is 〈〈〈String〉, String〉〉. In order to protect the contest server, our
f rewall contains a table for each of the three types in the set:

def= {〈String〉, 〈〈String〉, String〉, 〈〈〈String〉, String〉〉}.
An implementation of the contest server with a single site is described by:
I def= Env[F{plug}[C[open〈 〉 | plug〈entry〉]]],
Initially the f rewall contains only the pair (plug, plug+) in the table for the type 〈〈〈String〉, String〉〉.
As a result, the message plug〈entry〉 is intercepted, the content entry is marshaled, a fresh pair of keys
entry+, entry− is stored in the table for 〈〈String〉, String〉, and two processes are forked: Eplug[entry+]
which encrypts and sends entry+, and Rentry which awaitsmessages encryptedwith entry+. The evolution
SECURE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANNEL ABSTRACTIONS 61
of I is summarized in the following equivalence
I ≈ Env
[
def keys entry+, entry− in Eplug[entry+]
∣∣F {entry}{plug} [D, open〈 〉]].
where D is the def nition such thatC[ · ]= def D in [ · ]. The environment can then obtain the encryption
key entry+, typically but not necessarily by using a process Rplug, and hence can participate in the contest.
Later, whenever a new entry is received by Rentry and unmarshaled, it provides a key for encrypting a
response; a local continuation channel of type 〈String〉 is allocated for this response. The size of the
table for 〈String〉 may grow each time an entry is processed.
Similarly, we can wrap three-table f rewalls around all the processes of Section 2.1.3. By applying
Theorem 2 to the security properties stated in Section 2.1.3, we obtain corresponding implementation-
level security properties.
As a second implementation of the contest server, we consider the variant with proxies. This variant
can naturally be mapped to several sites, each protected by a f rewall of the kind described above.
Applying Theorem 6, we obtain the following equivalence, which expresses that the distribution of
proxies is transparent:
Env
F{plug1,plug2}
def D in open〈 〉| C1[open1〈 〉 | plug1〈entry1〉]
| C2[open2〈 〉 | plug2〈entry2〉]
 
≈ Env

def keys entry+, entry− in
F {entry}∅ [D,open〈 〉]∣∣ F{plug1,entry}[C1[open1〈 〉 | plug1〈entry1〉]]∣∣ F{plug2,entry}[C2[open2〈 〉 | plug2〈entry2〉]]
 .
The top process describes a centralized system where the contest server and the proxies are all at a
single site protected by a f rewall. The bottom process describes a distributed implementation with three
components protected by their own f rewalls. (Theorem 6 yields additional, superf uous occurrences of
plug1 and plug2 in the three f rewalls; we have removed those occurrences using simple equivalences.)
The two processes have different structures, but participants in the contest cannot distinguish them.
More importantly, perhaps, attackers cannot distinguish these two processes either—so communication
between the proxies and the server over the public network does not enable attacks.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes an implementation of a high-level language with secure channels in terms of
a lower-level language with primitives for encryption and decryption. The implementation relies on
cryptographic protocols for protecting communication over a public network. The design and analysis
of good cryptographic protocols always requires both ingenuity and care. However, this paper does not
focus on cryptographic protocols, but instead takes a broader perspective. It considers how the protocols
f t into larger systems and proves that we can reason about programs in the high-level language without
explicit concern for lower-level attacks on the protocols.
Several variants and extensions of our results would be attractive, for example the treatment of remote
method invocation in a typed object-oriented language and the mapping down to a low-level language
where keys are not formal symbols but f nite sequences of bits. More generally, many interesting
questions in security can be seen as problems of ref nement—relating views at different levels of
abstraction (e.g., [23]). Different views of security are appropriate for different communities of users,
administrators, designers, and programmers. The gaps between these views are sources of confusion
and vulnerability. Unfortunately, some of these gaps are still a fuzzy subject for research, because they
stem from fuzzy human expectations.
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APPENDICES
Notation. Let R and R′ be two binary relations. We write RR′ for the composition of R and R′,
when this composition is def ned, so x RR′ z if and only if there exists y such that x R y and y R z.
We writeR= for the ref exive closure ofR andR∗ for its ref exive and transitive closure. We use unionmulti for
disjoint set union; that is, S unionmulti S′ represents the union of the sets S and S′ plus the requirement that S
and S′ be disjoint.
A. Semantic Preliminaries
In this section, we detail the operational semantics of the sjoin-calculus and discuss the def nition of
observational equivalence. This section serves also as a review of the semantics of the join-calculus,
since it is a special case of that of the sjoin-calculus.
Formally, we treat repl, uids, and assoc as primitive constructs of the sjoin-calculus (but not of the
join-calculus). We therefore give the operational semantics of these constructs in this section. The
relation of observational equivalence is not affected by whether these constructs are encoded or taken
as primitive. On the other hand, taking them as primitive does impact the expansion relation and is
convenient for proofs.
Accordingly, we supplement the type system of the sjoin-calculus with a type for the names used in
accessing sets of unique identif ers and, for each join-calculus type σ , with a type for each of the two
names used in accessing association tables that relate values of type σ to values of type BitString. We
refer to these names as table names.
We extend the notation for sets of unique identif ers in order to represent the state of these sets. The
def nition uids t{u˜} denotes a table that contains the values u˜. Whenever we write uids t{u˜}, the values
u˜ are pairwise distinct. We identify uids t{ } with uids t .
We also introduce some auxiliary notation for association tables. We abbreviate assoc S, t(x) =
T, t ′(x+) = T ′ to assoc S, t, t ′ when the elided components are clear from context. Additionally, we
simply omit the set S when it is empty.
A.1. Scopes
First, in Fig. 3, we def ne the sets of free names (fv[v], fv[P], and fv[D]), def ned names (dv[J ] and
dv[D]), and received names (rv[J ]), for values, processes, join-patterns, and def nitions.
A name is fresh with respect to an expression or set of expressions when it does not occur free in
them. We write {v/x} for the substitution of the value v for the name x , write {v˜/x˜} for the substitution
of the values v1, . . . , vn for the names x1, . . . , xn when v˜ = v1, . . . , vn and x˜ = x1, . . . , xn , and let
σ range over arbitrary substitutions. We usually identify expressions up to renaming of bound names,
assuming implicit α-conversion in order to avoid name clashes. We require that, in every join-pattern,
all names be distinct. We also require that, in each def nition, each name be def ned either in reaction
rules or in at most one clause of any other form. (For example, both t〈u〉 	 P ∧ t〈v〉 	 Q and keys x, x
are legal def nitions, but keys x, y ∧ fresh x and uids t ∧ t〈u〉 	 P are not.)
A.2. Chemical Semantics
We present our operational semantics in the chemical style of Berry and Boudol [9], as a variant of
the ref exive chemical abstract machine [18].
The state of a computation is represented by a pair of multisets (D,P), called a chemical solution,
and written D & P , where:
• P is a multiset of processes, intuitively the processes running;
• D is a multiset of def nitions.
The rules for computation operate on chemical solutions. They form two families, structural rules
and reduction rules.
Structural rules are reversible and express the syntactic rearrangements of expressions in a solution.
We write them in the form D1 & P1 ⇀↽ D2 & P2, where ⇀ represents “heating” and ↽ represents
“cooling.” We usually omit the parts of D1, P1, D2, and P2 that are the same on both sides of ⇀↽. With
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fv[x] def= {x}
fv[{v1, . . . , vn}v] def= fv[v] ∪
⋃
i∈1..n fv[vi ]
fv[x〈v1, . . . , vn〉] def= {x} ∪
⋃
i∈1..n fv[vi ]
fv[if v = v′ then P else P ′] def= fv[P] ∪ fv[P ′] ∪ fv[v] ∪ fv[v′]
fv[decrypt v using v′ to x˜ in P else P ′] def= (fv[P] \ {x˜}) ∪ fv[P ′] ∪ fv[v] ∪ fv[v′]
fv[def D in P] def= (fv[P] ∪ fv[D]) \ dv[D]
fv[P | P ′] def= fv[P] ∪ fv[P ′]
fv[0] def= ∅
fv[repl P] def= fv[P]
fv[if not tset t(v) then P] def= fv[P] ∪ fv[v] ∪ {t}
fv[let y = t(v) in P] def= (fv[P] \ {y}) ∪ fv[v] ∪ {t}
fv[enter v, v′] def= fv[v] ∪ fv[v′]
rv[x〈y1, . . . , yn〉] def= {y1, . . . , yn}
rv[J | J ′] def= rv[J ] unionmulti rv[J ′]
dv[x〈y1, . . . , yn〉] def= {x}
dv[J | J ′] def= dv[J ] unionmulti dv[J ′]
dv[J 	 P] def= dv[J ]
dv[fresh x] def= {x}
dv[keys x+, x−] def= {x+, x−}
dv[D ∧ D′] def= dv[D] ∪ dv[D′]
dv[uids t{v1, . . . , vn}] def= {t}
dv[assoc S, t(x) = P, t ′(x ′) = P ′] def= {t, t ′}
fv[J 	 P] def= dv[J ] ∪ (fv[P]\rv[J ])
fv[fresh x] def= {x}
fv[keys x+, x−] def= {x+, x−}
fv[D ∧ D′] def= fv[D] ∪ fv[D′]
fv[uids t{v1, . . . , vn}] def= {t} ∪
⋃
i∈1..n fv[vi ]
fv[assoc S, t(x) = P, t ′(x ′) = P ′] def=
(fv[P] \ {x}) ∪ (fv[P ′] \ {x ′}) ∪ {t, t ′} ∪ ⋃(v,v′)∈S(fv[v] ∪ fv[v′])
FIG. 3. Scoping rules for the sjoin-calculus.
this abbreviation convention, we adopt the following structural rules for the sjoin-calculus
STR-NULL & 0 ⇀↽ &
STR-PAR & P1 | P2 ⇀↽ & P1, P2
STR-AND D1 ∧ D2 & ⇀↽ D1, D2 &
STR-DEF & def D in P ⇀↽ Dσdv & Pσdv
STR-REPL & repl P ⇀↽ & P | repl P
with the side condition for STR-DEF that dom(σdv) = dv[D] and that range(σdv) consists of fresh and
distinct names. The f rst three rules state that | and ∧ are associative and commutative, with unit 0
for | . The rule STR-DEF describes the introduction of new names and reaction rules in a solution; its
side condition ensures that we follow a static scoping discipline.
As an example, we rewrite the rule STR-DEF without our abbreviation convention. It becomes the
following: for every process def D in P and multisets D and P , for every substitution σdv that maps
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dv[D] to pairwise distinct names in N \(fv[P] ∪ fv[D] ∪ fv[def D in P]),
D & P ∪ {def D in P} ⇀↽ D ∪ {Dσdv} & P ∪ {Pσdv}.
Reduction rules represent proper, basic computation steps. We write them in the form D1 & P1 →
D2 & P2. We adopt the following reduction rules for the sjoin-calculus
RED J 	 P & Jσrv → J 	 P & Pσrv
COMPARE & if v = v then P else P ′ → & P
& if v = w then P else P ′ → & P ′
DECRYPT keys x+, x− & decrypt {v˜}x+ using x− to y˜ in P else P ′
→ keys x+, x− & P {v˜/y˜}
keys x+, x− & decrypt w using x− to y˜ in P else P ′
→ keys x+, x− & P ′
with the following side conditions: in RED, that dom(σrv) = rv[J ]; in the second clause of COMPARE,
that w = v; in the f rst clause of DECRYPT, that v˜ and y˜ are tuples of the same length; in the second
clause of DECRYPT, that w is not of the form {v˜}x+ with v˜ and y˜ of the same length. The rule RED
describes the use of a def nition clause to consumemessages and to produce a new instance of a guarded
process. The two rules COMPARE concern the comparison of values. The two rules DECRYPT concern
attempts to decrypt values. Note that a process that attempts to decrypt with a non-key will get stuck,
like decrypt w using { }x+ to y˜ in P else P ′ which uses { }x+ instead of a key; however, this problem
does not affect the processes that we construct.
We give additional reduction rules for the constructs uids and assoc, as follows.
UIDS uids t{u˜} & if not tset t(v) then P
→ uids t{u˜, v} & P
with the side condition v ∈ {u˜}. The rule UIDS states that the process if not tset t(v) then P atomically
tests whether v is present in the set {u˜} attached to the name t , and if not then it adds v to this set and
starts process P . Since there is no other rule that may reduce the process if not tset t(v) then P , this
process is inert if v ∈ {u˜}.
ASSOC assoc { ˜(u, u′), (v, v′)}, t, t ′ & let y = t(v) in P
→ assoc { ˜(u, u′), (v, v′)}, t, t ′ & P{v′/y}
ALLOC assoc { ˜(u, u′)}, t, t ′ & let y = t(v) in P
→ assoc { ˜(u, u′), (v, x ′σdv)}, t, t ′ ∧ Dσdv & P{x ′σdv/y} | Qσdv
with the side conditions for ALLOC that the process attached to t is def D in Q | enter x, x ′ (with x ′
def ned in D), that there is no pair in {(u˜, u′)} whose f rst element is v, that dom(σdv) = dv[D], and that
range(σdv) consists of fresh and distinct names. The rule ASSOC represents the case where the value v in
the query t(v) already appears in a pair (v, v′) present in the table; the associated value v′ is substituted
for the formal parameter y in P . The rule ALLOC represents the case where no value is associated with
v; a new pair (v, x ′σdv) is immediately added to the table. We also adopt two symmetric rules ASSOC’
and ALLOC’; we omit their formulations.
Chemical semantics provides a concise way to def ne concurrent reduction modulo structural equiv-
alence. This presentation, however, is equivalent to a more traditional presentation based on reduction
on processes (instead of chemical solutions). For processes, we def ne the relations of structural equiv-
alence and of reduction modulo structural equivalence by a combination of heating, reduction, and
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cooling of chemical solutions:
P ≡ P ′ def= ∅ & {P} ⇀↽∗ ∅ & {P ′}
P → P ′ def= ∅ & {P} ⇀↽∗ → ⇀↽∗ ∅ & {P ′}.
Relying on these def nitions, everywhere else in this paper we use reduction on processes rather than
on chemical solutions.
A.3. On Several Definitions of Observational Equivalence
Since every join-calculus process is also a sjoin-calculus process, we have two versions of observa-
tional equivalence for the join-calculus. One of them, which here we write≈ j , is the standard relation of
observational equivalence for the join-calculus, def ned by considering all join-calculus contexts. The
other one, which here we write ≈s j , is the relation of observational equivalence for the sjoin-calculus,
def ned by considering all sjoin-calculus contexts. As the next lemma shows, these two relations on
join-calculus processes coincide. Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we write ≈ instead of ≈ j and ≈s j ;
in proofs, we typically use the def nition of ≈ as ≈s j .
LEMMA 1. For all join-calculus processes P and Q, P ≈ j Q if and only if P ≈s j Q.
One could similarly argue that other possible variants in the def nitions of observational-equivalence
relations do not affect the resulting relations. In particular, one could allow ill-typed contexts in the
def nitions; intuitively, this corresponds to considering attackers that may not be well typed. We believe
that the relations of observational equivalence for the join-calculus and the sjoin-calculus are not affected
by this change.
B. Main Proofs
This appendix is organized as follows. First, we state some technical lemmas about equivalences and
proof techniques in the join-calculus; these lemmas are not specif c to security. Then, we state a few
lemmas about the basic properties of components of our protocols. The core of this appendix consists
of three independent series of results, about the correctness of the basic protocol, the correctness of the
session-based protocol, and the soundness of the translations. All essential proofs can be found in the
extended version of this paper [3]. Here, intermediate proofs are omitted.
B.1. Technical Lemmas
In order to prove our results in a modular manner, we rely on two co-inductive proof techniques,
namely observational equivalence up to expansion and expansion up to expansion [41]. Lemmas 2
and 3 are technical lemmas that state suff cient conditions for relations to be included in the relations
of observational equivalence and expansion, respectively; they are the basis for most of our proofs. The
proofs of these lemmas are tedious but standard diagram-chasing arguments.
LEMMA 2 (Equivalence up to expansion). To prove that a relation R is included in observational
equivalence (R ⊆ ≈), it suffices to prove that, for a fixed set of names N ′ ⊆N such that there are
infinitely many names of every type in N \N ′, and for all processes P and Q such that P R Q, we
have the following properties:
1. If P ↓x then Q ⇓x; conversely, if Q ↓x then P ⇓x.
2. C[P]≈R≈ C[Q] for every context C[ · ] of the form def D in R | [ · ] where fv[def D in
R] ∩N ′ = ∅.
3. If P → P ′, then Q →∗ Q′ and P ′  R= ≈ Q′ for some Q′.
4. If Q → Q′, then P →∗ P ′ and P ′ ≈R=  Q′ for some P ′.
5. (fv[P] ∪ fv[Q]) ∩N ′ = ∅.
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In the next lemma, and below, we write∼ for the relation of strong equivalence; as usual, this relation
is obtained from the def nition of ≈ by substituting ↓x for ⇓x and → for →∗. We omit the statement of
the strong variant of Lemma 2 that is obtained by substituting ↓x for ⇓x, → for →∗, and ∼ for ,  ,
and ≈.
LEMMA3 (Expansion up to expansion). To prove that a relationR is included in expansion (R ⊆  ),
it suffices to prove that, for a fixed set of names N ′ ⊆ N such that there are infinitely many names of
every type inN \N ′, and for all processes P and Q such that P R Q, we have the following properties:
1. If P ↓x then Q ⇓x; conversely, if Q ↓x then P ⇓x.
2. C[P]  R  C[Q] for every context C[ · ] of the form def D in R | [ · ] where fv[def D in
R] ∩N ′ = ∅.
3. If P → P ′, then Q →∗ Q′ and P ′  R=  Q′ for some Q′.
4. If Q → Q′, then P →∗ P ′ and P ′  R= ∼ Q′ for some P ′.
5. (fv[P] ∪ fv[Q]) ∩N ′ = ∅.
In the special case where P R Q implies P (→∗  )∗ Q, the proof requirements can be further
weakened: properties (1) and (4) are always true.
In order to establish the requirements of Lemmas 2 and 3, we can use relations stronger than those
mentioned. For instance, since we have≡ ⊆ ∼ ⊆  ⊆ ≈, all proofs can be performed up to structural
equivalence and up to strong equivalence. When we use Lemmas 2 and 3, we typically let N ′ collect
names that are already bound in the processes being considered, for example emit and recv. We may
omit the def nition of N ′ and the check of property (5) when they are trivial.
These two lemmas lead to smaller relations and to simpler proofs. In particular, let us consider a
relationR consisting of pairs of processes that are also related by some reduction that commutes with
every other reduction; we call those reductions deterministic. For example, the relation could be:
R def= {(C[if u = u then P else Q], C[P]) | C[ · ] an evaluation context}.
We immediately obtain R ⊆  so, in proofs up to expansion, we can simplify processes by applying
the deterministic reductions as soon as possible. For example, we may replace if u = u then P else Q
with P in every evaluation context.
The next lemma is a direct consequence of our specif cation of association tables. It is useful for
describing access to the tables in f rewalls as expansion relations.
We say that an association table assoc S, t, t ′ is bijective if whenever (u, u′) ∈ S and (v, v′) ∈ S we
have u = u′ if and only if v = v′. (Every table that appears in a f rewall is bijective.)
LEMMA 4. For all processes P and P ′, if P → P ′ by applying one of the chemical rules ASSOC,
ASSOC’, ALLOC, or ALLOC’ with a bijective table in P, then we have P  P ′.
The next lemma relates two formulations of equivalence relations. The f rst formulation is more
compact, and appears in statements of our theorems. The second formulation is closed by application
of evaluation contexts and is used in the proofs and in the lemmas. The lemma is valid in both the
join-calculus and the sjoin-calculus.
LEMMA 5. LetR be one of the relations ∼,  , and ≈. Let X be a set of names, X˜ be a set of tuples
that partitions the names in X, {plugx˜ | x˜ ∈ X˜} be a family of names indexed by X˜ , and PX˜ abbreviate
the process
∏
x˜∈X˜ plugx˜ 〈x˜〉.
For all processes P1, P2 and definitions D1, D2 where none of the names plugx˜ occur free, and such
that there are no free table names in def D1 in P1 or def D2 in P2, the two following statements are
equivalent:
1. def D1 in P1 | PX˜ R def D2 in P2 | PX˜
2. for all D and P such that fv[def D in P] ∩ (dv[D1] ∪ dv[D2]) ⊆ X and dv[D] ∩ (dv[D1] ∪
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dv[D2]) = ∅,
def D ∧ D1 in P | P1 R def D ∧ D2 in P | P2
We illustrate the use ofLemma5by considering the compact sjoin-calculus equivalence that appears in
Theorem 2. We apply Lemma 5 with X˜ = {〈emit, recv〉} and with plug〈emit, recv〉 = plug. Up to structural
equivalence, and for any processes P1 and P2 in the join-calculus, the following two statements are
equivalent:
1. Env[[[P1]]] ≈ Env[[[P2]]]
2. for every sjoin-calculus process def D in P such that emit and recv are not def ned in D,
E [def D in P | [[P1]] | W] ≈ E [def D in P | [[P2]] | W].
This second statement deals with forms stable by reduction; D and P represent an arbitrary context,
intuitively an attacker.
B.2. Basic Properties of the Public Network
Weare interested in equivalences in contexts that represent a public networkwith the noise-generating
process W. By def nition, we have:
E [ · | W] = def recv〈κ〉 | emit〈m〉 	 κ〈m〉 in
[ · ] | repl (def fresh m in repl emit〈m〉).
Rearranging a parallel composition, we also have:
Env[ · ] ≡ E [plug〈emit,recv〉 | [ · ] | W].
We def ne generalizations E··· [ · ] and W··· of E [ · ] and W, respectively:
E x±1 , . . . , x±m ,
k1, . . . , kn ,
d1, . . . , dp
[ · ] def= def ∧i∈1..mkeys x+i , x−i
∧ ∧ j∈1..nkey k j
∧ ∧l∈1..pfresh dl in E [ · ]
Wd1,...,dp
def= W | ∏l∈1..prepl emit〈dl〉.
We abbreviate Ex±1 ,...,x±m [ · ] to EX± [ · ] when X± = {x±1 , . . . , x±m }. We always assume in the following
that names that are bound in contexts E... [] and Env[ ]—that is, recv, emit, and every index variable in
E... [ ]—are not masked by other def nitions that appear in the context.
The use of a substitution of a ciphertext for a name enables us to capture the notion that a certain
context has access to the ciphertext but not to its components. This substitution is important for achieving
stability by reduction, because the ciphertext may be intercepted in the course of reduction. The next
lemma says that the ciphertext cannot be distinguished from noise without knowledge of the decryption
key.
LEMMA 6. For all Q, k, d, and v˜ such that k does not occur in Q and d does not occur in v˜, we
have:
Ek [Q {{v˜}k/d}] ∼ Ed [Q].
The next lemma describes the behavior of the f ltering reception let y˜ = filter x− in Q in a network
that provides a message m.
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LEMMA 7. Let C[ · ] be the context Ex± [def D in P | · ] , and let R be the process decrypt m using
x− to y˜ in Q else (emit〈m〉 | recv〈κ〉). For all D, P, Q, m, we have the sequence of reductions:
C[emit〈m〉 | let y˜ = filter x− in Q] ≡ C[def κ〈m〉 	 R in emit〈m〉 | recv〈κ〉]
→ C[def κ〈m〉 	 R in κ〈m〉]
→ C[def κ〈m〉 	 R in R].
In case m is of the form {v˜}x+ for some v˜ of the same length as y˜, decryption in R succeeds, and the
sequence continues as follows:
C[def κ〈m〉 	 R in R] →≡ C[Q{v˜/y˜} | def κ〈m〉 	 R in 0] ∼ C[Q{v˜/y˜}].
In all other cases, decryption in R fails, and yields back the initial process:
C[def κ〈m〉 	 R in R] → C[def κ〈m〉 	 R in emit〈m〉 | recv〈κ〉]
≡ C[emit〈m〉 | let y˜ = filter x− in Q].
In any case, the last two steps of reduction (→→) are deterministic and can thus be replaced with
expansion ( ).
In the whole section, when the process Q and the names x− and y˜ are clear from context, we use the
abbreviations K〈m〉 and Km for the derivatives of emit〈m〉 | let y˜ = filter x− in Q. Thus, we take
K〈m〉
def= def κ〈m〉 	 R in κ〈m〉
Km
def= def κ〈m〉 	 R in R,
where R is decrypt m using x− to y˜ in Q else (emit〈m〉 | recv〈κ〉). With this convention, we can rewrite
the f rst two reductions of the lemma above as:
C[emit〈m〉 | let y˜ = filter x− in Q] → C[K〈m〉] → C[Km].
Lemma 8 says that, when both emission and f ltered reception are replicated, communication occurs.
LEMMA 8. Let C[ · ] be the following sjoin-calculus context:
C[ · ] def= Ex±
def D in P | [ · ] | W| (repl emit〈{v˜}x+〉)
| (repl let y˜ = filter x− in Q)
 .
For every D, P, Q, and v˜ such that the tuples v˜ and y˜ have the same length, we have the expansion
relation C[0] C[Q{v˜/y˜}].
The following lemma says that, when a replicated emission and a f ltered reception are the only
processes with access to a shared key k, communication occurs.
LEMMA 9. For all D, P, Q, v˜, and y˜ in which k does not occur free and such that v˜ and y˜ have the
same lengths and d does not occur free in v˜, we have:
Ek [(def D in P | Wd | let y˜ = filter k in Q) {{v˜}k/d}]  Ed [ def D in P|Wd |Q{v˜/y˜} ].
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B.3. Correctness of the Basic Protocol
We f rst extend our notations in order to represent the intermediate states of the receiving process of
the basic protocol, Rx . We def ne:
Rx {u˜}[G] def= def uids tx {u˜} in G | repl Fx .
Intuitively, the process G represents intermediate states of the receiving process in the course of pro-
cessing arriving messages. In particular, G is 0 when the receiving process is in its initial state: since
Rx is def uids tx in repl Fx , we have that Rx ≡ Rx {}[0].
In the proofs about the basic protocol, whenever we write Rx {u˜}[G], we assume that G is the parallel
composition of derivatives of processes of the form emit〈m〉 | Fx .We apply Lemma 7 in order to describe
those derivatives. In applying Lemma 7, we let
Qc,v˜ def= if not tset tx (c) then x◦〈v˜〉
and take Q = Qc,y˜ , so G is the parallel composition of processes of the forms K〈m〉, Km , and Qc,v˜ .
(The process Qc,v˜ is obtained from a process Km by a successful decryption in the case m = {c, v˜}x+ .)
For example, G might be K〈m〉 | Km ′ , with m and m ′ arbitrary values of type BitString.
Because the basic protocol relies on replicated emissions and receptions, G may contain more than
one component of the form Qc,v˜ . Lemma 10 states that such components can be discarded (up to strong
equivalence) whenever the value c is already registered in the set tx of unique identif ers.
LEMMA 10. For all D, P, u˜, v˜, c we have the strong equivalence:
def uids tx {u˜, c} ∧ D in (P | Qc,v˜) ∼ def uids tx {u˜, c} ∧ D in P.
Lemma 11 states that what is left after a successful run of the protocol is indistinguishable from noise
and can be discarded (up to strong equivalence).
LEMMA 11. For all D, P, G, u˜, v˜ such that the length of v˜ is the arity of x, the name x− occurs only
as a decryption key within G and Fx , the name c does not occur in D, P, G, u˜, v˜, and the name d does
not occur in v˜, we have the strong equivalence:
Ex±,c [(def D in P | Wd | Rx {u˜, c}[G]){{c, v˜}x+/d}]
∼ Ex±,d [def D in P | Wd | Rx {u˜}[G]].
Lemma 12 concerns the progress of pending communication.
LEMMA 12. Let C[ · ] be a context of the form
C[ · ] def= Ex±,c [(def D in P | Wd | [ · ]){{c, v˜}x+/d}],
where the substitution {{c, v˜}x+/d} operates both on the context def D in P | Wd | [ · ] and on the process
put in the hole of this context. Assume that the length of the tuple v˜ is the arity of x, that d is not bound
in D, that c and x− do not occur in D, P, u˜, and v˜, and that d does not occur in v˜. Let G be a parallel
composition of derivatives of emit〈m〉 | Fx for values m where c and x− occur only in processes Qc,v˜
(but d may occur in m).
We have the expansion relation:
C[Rx {u˜}[G]]  C[Rx {u˜, c}[G] | x◦〈v˜〉].
We are now ready to prove all the correctness requirements stated in Section 5 for the basic protocol.
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Proof of correctness for the basic protocol. We use the following family R of receiving processes
(up to structural equivalence): {
Rx {u˜}
[∏
(c,v˜)∈S Qc,v˜
]}
,
where {u˜} ranges over sets of values of type BitString in which x− does not occur, and where S ranges
over multisets of pairs (c, v˜) such that the length of v˜ is the arity of x and x− does not occur in c or v˜.
1. Rx ≡ Rx {}[0].
2. This condition is syntactically obvious once we note that all the names of u˜, v˜, and c must be
of type BitString.
3. This condition is also syntactically obvious.
4. We must prove that
Envx± [ R | Ex [v˜] ]  Envx± [ R | x◦〈v˜〉 ]
for every R ∈ R.
By applying Lemma 5 with X = {emit, recv, x+}, followed by structural equivalence, this statement
is equivalent to the following: for all D and P such that x− /∈ fv[def D in P] and x−, x+, emit, recv /∈
dv[D], for every R ∈ R,
Ex± [def D in P | W | R | Ex [v˜]]  Ex± [def D in P | W | R | x◦〈v˜〉] .
Next, we derive this expansion relation by composing those of Lemmas 12 and 11. For all S, {u˜}, v˜,
D, and P in which x− does not occur, for any fresh names c and d, we let G = ∏(c′,v˜′)∈S Qc′,v˜′ , and
obtain the series of relations:
Ex± [def D in P | W | Rx {u˜}[G] | Ex [v˜]]
≡ Ex±,c[ (def D in P | Wd | Rx {u˜}[G]) {{c, v˜}x+/d} ] (1)
 Ex±,c[ (def D in P | Wd | Rx {u˜, c}[G] | x◦〈v˜〉) {{c, v˜}x+/d} ] (2)
 Ex±,d [ def D in P | Wd | Rx {u˜}[G] | x◦〈v˜〉 ] (3)
≡ Ex± [ def D in P | W | Rx {u˜}[G] | x◦〈v˜〉 ]. (4)
The f rst structural equivalence (1) is obtained by extending the scope of the newunique identif er c out
of Ex [v˜]
def= def fresh c in repl emit〈{c, v˜}x+〉; by hypothesis, the name c does not appear elsewhere in the
initial process, thus there is no capture as its def nition is lifted to Ex±,c [ · ]. The expansion (2) is obtained
by applying Lemma 12 for n = 0 and G ′ = G. The expansion (3) is obtained by applying Lemma 11,
taking P | x◦〈v˜〉 for P and using that x− does not occur in v˜. The f nal structural equivalence (4) is
obtained by f rst restricting the scope of d to the noise generator Wd—by hypothesis, d does not occur
in any other part of the process—then by using the structural equivalence W ≡ def fresh d in Wd .
5. Suppose that
Envx± [Rx | emit〈m〉] → P
and that x+ and x− do not occur in m. The only possible reduction of Envx± [ Rx | emit〈m〉 ] is the
f rst reduction shown in Lemma 7, where the message emit〈m〉 is consumed and turned into a mes-
sage on a continuation channel, κ〈m〉. Since x+ and x− do not occur in m, it follows that m cannot
be a ciphertext with key x+. Therefore, the case of Lemma 7 for failing decryptions applies, hence
P  Envx± [ Rx | emit〈m〉 ].
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6. We prove that if Rx {u˜}[G] ∈ R, x− does not occur in m, and
Envx± [Rx {u˜}[G] | emit〈m〉] → P
then
P  Envx± [R′ | T ]
for some R′ ∈ R and some process T such that x− does not occur in T . The proof of this condition
uses Lemma 7 too. It has several cases; the case analysis depends on the value of m and on the choice
of reduction inside the receiving process.
1. Reception of a message {c, v˜}x+ for some v˜ such that its length equals the arity of x . Applying
Lemma 7 we obtain
P  Envx± [Rx {u˜}[G | Qc,v˜]].
Since x− does not occur in v˜, the pair (c, v˜) can be added to the multiset S associated with G. We let
T = 0 and R′ = Rx {u˜}[G | Qc,v˜].
2. Reception of any other message m. Applying Lemma 7, we obtain
P  Envx± [Rx {u˜}[G] | emit〈m〉] .
3. Internal reduction (independent of the message). The only reductions in Rx {u˜}[G] occur when
a process Qc,v˜ successfully registers the unique identif er c in the table of Rx , using rule UID, and
G ≡ G ′ | Qc,v˜ for some G ′.
Envx± [Rx {u˜}[G ′ | Qc,v˜] | emit〈m〉] → Envx± [Rx {u˜, c}[G ′ | x◦〈v˜〉] | emit〈m〉]
We let T = x◦〈v˜〉. By the def nition of R, we have that x− does not occur in v˜ and that Rx {u˜, c}
[G ′] ∈ R.
B.4. Correctness of the Session-Based Protocol
The proof for the session-based protocol has the same structure as the one for the basic protocol, but
it is actually simpler. Although the session-based protocol has several steps, sessions are independent of
one another; Lemmas 8 and 9 can be used to reason about each session separately. However, a technical
complication is that a receiving process Rx may respond several times, and with several different keys,
to messages from a single process Ex [v˜]; until Ex [v˜] accepts a particular one of the keys, all these
sessions are potentially useful.
In the proof, we use the following substitutions:
σn
def= {{k}x+/d, {k ′1}k/d ′1, . . . , {k ′n}k/d ′n} for n ≥ 0
ρn
def= σn
{{v˜}k ′n /d ′′} for n ≥ 1.
Wealways assume that all the names d, d ′i , d ′′, k, k ′i are distinct.We apply these substitutions to a process
only when the values substituted for d , d ′i , and d ′′ do not appear in the process before the substitution.
When v˜ and x are clear from context, we use also the following abbreviations for f ltering receptions:
Hk
def= let k ′ = filter k in repl emit〈{v˜}k ′ 〉
H ′k ′i
def= let y˜ = filter k ′i in x◦〈y˜〉
Qk def= def key k ′ in (repl emit〈{k ′}k〉) | H ′k ′ .
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In the arguments about the session-based protocol, we assume that G is the parallel composition of
derivatives K〈m〉 or Km of processes of the form emit〈m〉 | Fx , as described in Lemma 7. This convention
is analogous to that for G in the basic protocol. In applying Lemma 7, here we take Q = Qk .
Intuitively, Lemma 13 implies that all abortive sessions can be discarded (up to expansion) on the
receiving side once the sending side has terminated.
LEMMA 13. For all n ≥ 1, for all D and P, if k does not occur in D, P, and v˜, if the names d ′i
for i > n and k ′i for i ≥ 1 do not occur in D, P, and G, and if x− occurs only as a decryption key in
Rx | G, then we have:
Ex±,k,k ′1,...,k ′n
[(
def D in Rx | G | P | Wd,d ′1,...,d ′n ,d ′′ |
n−1∏
i=1
H ′k ′i
)
ρn
]
 Ex±,d,d ′1,...,d ′n ,d ′′
[
def D in Rx | G | P | Wd,d ′1,...,d ′n ,d ′′
]
.
Lemma 14 states that the session-based protocol transmits messages reliably and secretly and thus
establishes correctness condition 4.
LEMMA 14. For all D, P, and v˜ in which x− does not occur free and such that the length of v˜ is the
arity of x, we have the expansion relation:
Ex± [def D in Rx | Ex [v˜] | P | W]  Ex± [def D in Rx | x◦〈v˜〉 | P | W] .
Proof of correctness for the session-based protocol. Because there is no shared state between
sessions of the session-based protocol, we can let the set R of receiving processes be the singleton {Rx }.
1, 2, 3. These conditions are immediate.
4. This condition is an instance of Lemma 14 in the case where D is empty and P = plug〈emit,
recv〉 | plugx 〈x+〉.
5. The process Rx has no internal reductions; whenever it receives a message, it attempts to
decrypt it using x−. If Envx± [Rx | emit〈v〉] → P and x+ and x− do not occur in v, then v is not
encrypted with x+, so
P  Envx± [Rx | emit〈v〉]
follows from Lemma 7 (in the case where decryption fails).
6. This condition also follows from Lemma 7. The case where decryption fails is covered as in
condition 5. When decryption succeeds, we have
Envx± [Rx | emit〈{u}x+〉] →  Envx± [Rx | Qu]
and x− does not occur in Qu since it does not occur in u.
B.5. Soundness Properties of the Translations
Next, we show that both translations are equivalent, then we establish that they are fully abstract.
Throughout this section, we assume a f xed, correct underlying communication protocol (Rx , Ex [ · ]);
we write Rx for a corresponding set of receiving processes, as described in Def nition 1. We also let 
be a f xed, f nite set of types of the join-calculus that is closed under decomposition.
We make explicit and extend our assumptions on names by partitioning the names and by specifying
some f xed functions · +, · −, and · ◦. For a set of names S, we write S+, S−, and S◦ for the sets of
names obtained by decorating every name in S with a+, a−, or a ◦. We choose T = ⋃σ∈{tσ , t ′σ } such
that names in T do not clash with the free names of Rx and Ex [ · ]. Informally, T gathers the names that
are private to the f rewall. We distinguish two disjoint sets of names of the join-calculus B and F such
that there is an inf nite number of names of every type in  in both B and F and an inf nite number of
names of any sjoin-calculus type inN \(B ∪F). In the proofs of this section, we use elements of B for
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the names def ned in a process P under consideration and elements of F for the names free in P . We
refer to the names in B as internal names and to the names in F as external names. We assume that the
functions · +, · −, and · ◦ have the following properties.
1. The function · + has domain B ∪ F and yields values of type BitString.
2. The restriction of · + to B is injective and yields names of type BitString.
3. For every join-calculus type σ ∈ , the restriction of · + to names of type σ is a bijection with
range {v of type BitString | fv[v] ∩ B− = ∅}.
4. The function · ◦ has domain B, is injective, and maps every name x ∈ B to a name x◦ of type
〈BitString, . . . , BitString〉 with the same arity as x .
5. The function · − has domain B, is injective, and yields names of type BitString.
6. For all x ∈ B, neither x+ nor x− is a free name of E[ · ][ · ] or R[ · ].
Because of these properties, the only free names of type BitString of a translation [[D]] or [[P]] are in
the image of · +. We show this property by considering the ways in which free names of type BitString
can appear in [[D]] or [[P]]: (a) in the guards of comparisons; (b) as x+ or in v˜+ as part of Ex [v˜+]; (c) as
free names of E[ · ][ · ] or R[ · ]. (Although x+ and x− can appear free in Rx , they are immediately bound
in the surrounding context.) Trivially, cases (a) and (b) yield names in the image of · +. In case (c), the
name cannot be in B− (by Assumption 6), so it is in the image of · + (by Assumption 3).
We f rst focus on the f ltering translation.We introduce a shorter notation for the contents of f rewalls:
for all f nite sets X ⊂ B and F ⊂ F we let:
D(X,F)
def= D(X ∪ F) ∧
∧
x∈X
Dx◦	x ∧
∧
x∈F
Dx	Ex .
For every type σ ∈ , Assumption 3 guarantees that the association table for σ in D(X ∪ F) is
bijective.
The next lemma describes the unfolding of a f rewall as a message crosses it, either from the context
outside (intrusion of a message z◦〈y˜+〉) or from the process inside (extrusion of a message y〈z˜〉).
LEMMA 15. For all finite sets of names X ⊂ B and F ⊂ F, for every definition D, process P, and
family of processes R′x ∈ Rx for x ∈ X, if no decryption key y− ∈ B− occurs in D, P, D(X,F), or R′x
for x = y, and if names in T occur only in D(X,F), then we have the expansion relations:
1. for all well-formed messages z〈y˜〉 with z ∈ X and {y˜} ⊂ X ∪ F, for Y def= {y˜} \ (X ∪ F),
EX±
[
def D(X,F) ∧ D in z◦〈y˜+〉 |
∏
x∈X
R′x | P
]
 EX±
[
def D(X,F∪Y ) ∧ D in z〈y˜〉 |
∏
x∈X
R′x | P
]
2. for all well-formed messages y〈z˜〉 with y ∈ F and {z˜} ⊂ B ∪ F, for Z def= {z˜} \ (X ∪ F),
EX±
[
def D(X,F) ∧ D in y〈z˜〉 |
∏
x∈X
R′x | P
]
 E(X∪Z )±
[
def D(X∪Z ,F) ∧ D in Ey[z˜+] |
∏
x∈X
R′x |
∏
z∈Z
Rz | P
]
.
In what follows, we use normal forms for processes and their translations. For any join-calculus
process P , we have P ≡ M ′ | T or P ≡ def D in M | M ′ | T , where M is a parallel composition of
messages sent on names def ned in D, M ′ is a parallel composition of messages sent on free names, and
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T is a parallel composition of processes of the form if v = w then Q else Q′. Each of M , M ′, and T
may be 0, and D may be empty (formally, any def nition whose names are not free in M | M ′ | T ). We
typically consider only the case def D in M | M ′ | T , since the case M ′ | T is analogous but simpler.
The next lemma relates the compositional translation to a variant where the cryptographic proto-
col is short-circuited for messages on channels with internal names. We rely on an auxiliary transla-
tion [[ · ]]◦ with the same structural def nition as the compositional translation [[ · ]] of Section 4 except for
messages x〈v˜〉 in evaluation contexts:
[[x〈v˜〉]]◦ def=
{
x◦〈v˜+〉 when x ∈ B
[[x〈v˜〉]] otherwise.
LEMMA 16. Let X ⊂ B and F ⊂ F be two finite sets of names, let C[ · ] be a context of the form
C[ · ] def= EX±
[
def D′ in [ · ] | Q | W |
∏
x∈X
R′x
]
,
where R′x ∈ Rx for every x ∈ X, and where the names in B−, (B\X )◦, and (B\X )+ are not free
in D′, Q, F+, or R′x (except for x◦, x+, and x− in R′x ), and let P be a join-calculus process with
fv[P] ⊆ X ∪ F and with bound names in B\X. We have the expansion relation:
C[[[P]]]  C[[[P]]◦].
Our next lemma relates the compositional translation and the f ltering translation of the same join-
calculus process, in a context that def nes the network and features some low-level def nitions DA
and processes PA. The processes considered are in a stable form up to expansion (that is, they are
in a form that ref ects possible communication with the context and that is not broken by subsequent
communication with the context followed by applications of the expansion relations of the previous
lemmas).
LEMMA 17. For every join-calculus process def D in P, sjoin-calculus process def DA in PA, finite
sets of names X, L , and F, and family of processes R′x ∈ Rx indexed by x ∈ X, we have the observational
equivalence
E(X∪L)±
[
def DA ∧ [[D]] in PA | [[P]]◦ | W |
∏
x∈X
R′x |
∏
x∈L
Rx
]
≈ EX±
[
def DA ∧ D(X,F) ∧ D in PA | P | W |
∏
x∈X
R′x
]
provided that:
1. dv[D] = X unionmulti L ⊂ B and fv[def D in P] ⊆ F ⊂ F .
2. Names in B unionmulti F occur only in D, P, and D(X,F).
3. Names x◦ in (B\X )◦ occur only in [[D]] and Rx , and X◦ ∩ dv[DA] = ∅.
4. Names x+ in (B\X )+ occur only in [[P]]◦, [[D]], and Rx (but not in fv[F+]).
5. Names x− in B− occur only in R′x and Rx .
6. Names in T occur only in D(X,F).
7. Names bound in P and in every process within D are all in B\X.
Proof. LetN ′ = B unionmulti B◦ unionmulti B+ unionmulti B− unionmultiF unionmulti T unionmulti {emit, recv}, letR be the relation that contains all
the pairs of processes (P1, P2) that meet the invariants of the lemma, and letR′ ⊆ R be the subrelation
whose processes meet the additional invariant:
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8. P is M | T where M is a parallel composition of messages x〈v˜〉 with x ∈ dv[D] and where T
is a parallel composition of comparisons.
We f rst prove that R ⊆ ≡R′ by showing how to normalize a pair of processes (P1, P2) in R to a
pair of processes inR′. To enforce Invariant 8, we use a normal form P ≡ def D′ in M | M ′ | T where
dv[D′] ⊂ B\dv[D] (by α-conversion) and where M and M ′ are parallel compositions of messages sent
on names in X ∪ L ∪ dv[D′] and in F , respectively.
In P1, our hypotheses guarantee that the structural equivalence above commutes with the auxiliary
translation: for every name x ∈ B\(X ∪ L) introduced by α-conversion, the Invariants 3, 4, and 5,
respectively, ensure that the names x◦, x+, and x− obtained from our functions on names do not occur
in P1 in the same scope as [[P]]◦. We apply α-conversion in P1 to use these particular names, unfold
the def nition of [[def D′ in M | M ′ | T ]]◦, then lift the def nitions [[D′]] and ∧x∈dv[D′] keys x+, x− that
appear in the translation to put them in conjunction with D and with the key def nitions in EX∪L [ · ],
respectively.
In P2, each message y〈z˜〉 within M ′ is such that y ∈ F ; hence we can apply Lemma 15(2) to unfold
the f rewall; as a result, the tables in the f rewall are extended with pairs (z, z+) for each name z ∈
fv[M ′]\(X ∪ F), while the message y〈z˜〉 is replaced with the emitting process [[y〈z˜〉]] = Ey[z˜+].
Applying structural equivalence, we have P1 ≡ P ′1 R P ′2 ≡ P2 for a pair of processes P ′1 and P ′2
derived from P1 and P2 by substituting
• X ′ def= X ∪ (fv[M ′]\F) for X ,
• L ′ def= (L ∪ dv[D′])\fv[M ′] for L ,
• D ∧ D′ for D,
• PA | [[M ′]] for PA,
• M | T for P .
We easily check that P ′1 and P
′
2 meet all eight invariants:
1. Let U def= dv[D′]∩ fv[M ′] and V def= L ∩ fv[M ′]. Decomposing fv[M ′] according to the partition
X unionmulti dv[D′] unionmulti L unionmulti F , we obtain X ′ = X ∪ (U unionmulti V ) and L ′ = (L ∪ dv[D′])\(U unionmulti V ); moreover, the
sets X , U , dv[D′]\U , V , and L\V are disjoint subsets of B. We rearrange names def ned in D ∧ D′ to
meet the new instance of the invariant:
dv[D ∧ D′] = (X unionmulti L) unionmulti dv[D′]
= (X unionmulti (L\V ) unionmulti V ) unionmulti (U unionmulti (dv[D′]\U ))
= (X unionmulti U unionmulti V ) unionmulti ((L unionmulti dv[D′])\(U unionmulti V ))
= X ′ unionmulti L ′.
2. We check that fv[[[M ′]]] ∩ (B unionmulti F) = ∅.
3. Additional names in B◦ appear only in dv[[[D′]]] = dv[D′]◦.
4. Additional names in B+ appear for x ∈ dv[D′] in translated terms and processes R′x ; they
appear in [[M ′]] only when they also appear in X ′\X .
5. Additional names in B− appear only in R′x and Rx for x ∈ dv[D′].
6. These names are not affected.
7. Additional bound names appear only as we choose a normal form for P .
8. This holds by construction of M and T .
Next, we study the names that may occur free in processes (P1, P2) related byR and argue that these
names are not inN ′. Within P1, the context E(X∪L)± [ · ] binds (X ∪ L)+ ∪ (X ∪ L)− ∪ {emit, recv} and,
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by def nition of [[D]] plus Invariant 1, we have (X ∪ L)◦ = dv[[[D]]], so
fv[P1] ⊆
(
fv[def DA in PA] ∪ fv[[[D]]] ∪ fv[[[P]]◦] ∪ fv[W ] ∪ fv
[∏
x∈X
R′x
∣∣∣∣∣ ∏
x∈L
Rx
])
\
((X ∪ L)+ ∪ (X ∪ L)− ∪ (X ∪ L)◦ ∪ {emit, recv})
Within P2, the context EX± [ · ] binds X+ ∪ X− ∪ {emit, recv}, and we have X◦ ∪ F ∪ T ⊆ dv[D(X,F)]
by def nition of D(X,F) and X ∪ L = dv[D] by invariant 1, so
fv[P2] ⊆
(
fv[def DA in PA] ∪ fv[D] ∪ fv[D(X,F)] ∪ fv[P] ∪ fv[W ] ∪ fv
[∏
x∈X
R′x
])
\
(X ∪ L ∪ F ∪ X+ ∪ X− ∪ X◦ ∪ T ∪ {emit, recv}).
We now detail the free variables of the subterms above. We have fv[W ] = {emit}. By Invariants 2–6,
(fv[DA]∪ fv[PA])∩N ′ ⊆ X+ ∪ X◦ ∪ {emit, recv}. By correctness condition 2 on the protocol,
fv[Ex [ · ]]∪ fv[R′x ]∪ fv[Rx ] with x ∈ X ∪ L may contain names in {emit, recv, x◦, x+, x−} bound in the
enclosing context, and other names of type BitString, which must be outsideN ′ by Assumption 6 on · +
and · −. We let Z be the set of these other names. By Invariant 1, fv[D]∪ fv[P] ⊆ X ∪ L ∪ F . By def ni-
tion of the translation, fv[[[D]]]∪fv[[[P]]◦] ⊆ (X ∪L)+∪(X ∪L)−∪(X ∪L)◦ ∪ fv[F+]∪{emit, recv}∪Z .
By def nition of the f rewall, fv[D(X,F)] ⊆ dv[D(X,F)]∪ X ∪ X+ ∪ X− ∪ fv[F+]∪ {emit, recv} ∪ Z .
Next, we check that names in fv[F+]∩N ′ cannot be free in P1 or P2: since names in fv[F+] are of type
BitString, fv[F+] ∩N ′ ⊆ B+ ∪ B−; by Invariant 4, names x+ in fv[F+] ∩ B+ are limited to names in
X+, which are bound in the context; by Assumption 3 on · +, names in B− are excluded. In summary,
we obtain:
fv[P1] ∪ fv[P2] ⊆ (fv[def DA in PA] ∪ fv[F+] ∪ Z )\N ′.
We now use Lemma 2 to prove that R′ ⊆ ≈. We let P1 R′ P2 and argue that P1 and P2 satisfy the
f ve properties required in Lemma 2. Property 5 of Lemma 2 immediately follows from our analysis
of fv[P1] ∪ fv[P2]. To establish property 5, we remark that the strong barbs of P1 and P2 coincide by
arguing that they are exactly the strong barbs of PA on channel names outsideN ′ that are not bound by
DA.
To establish property 2, we consider an evaluation context of the form def DB in PB | [ · ] such that
fv[def DB in PB]∩N ′ = ∅. Using α-conversion after applying this context to P1 and P2, we can assume
that dv[DA]∩ (fv[DB]∪ fv[PB]) = ∅ and dv[DB]∩N ′ = ∅. Then, we have def DB in PB | P1 ≡ P ′1 R′
P ′2 ≡ def DB in PB | P2 for the processes P ′1 and P ′2 obtained from P1 and P2 by substituting DA ∧ DB
for DB and PA | PB for PA. Invariants 1, 7, and 8 are not affected; Invariants 2–6 immediately follow
from (fv[DB] ∪ fv[PB]) ∩N ′ = ∅.
To establish the bisimulation properties (3 and 4), we prove that, for every reduction P1 → Q1, there
are processes P ′1 and P
′
2 such that
P1 → Q1  P ′1R P ′2 ∗←∗ P2
andvice versa for every reduction P2 → Q2. (SinceR ⊆ ≡R′, this suff ces to obtain the corresponding
relations withR′ instead ofR, as required in Lemma 2.) The proof is by cases, relying on the following
partition of reductions: reductions internal to DA and PA, reductions using the join-pattern modeling the
network inE [ · ], reductions internal to a particular receiving process in∏x∈X R′x or∏x∈L Rx , reductions
using a join-pattern of D or its translation [[D]], reductions of comparisons in T or its translation [[T ]],
and reductions using a join-pattern in D(X,F).
Reductions internal to DA and PA. Every reduction internal to PA or of a join-pattern of DA
matched in PA is the same on both sides of R′; the processes P ′1 and P ′2 are obtained from P1 and P2
by substituting new terms D′A and P ′A for DA and PA, with at most the same free names.
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Reductions using the join-pattern of E [ · ] and reductions internal to a receiving process R′x . In
case of a reduction using E [ · ], the emission emit〈m〉 is necessarily in PA or W (not in Rx or R′x , by
correctness condition 3) and thus available in both P1 and P2; besides, we can assume that the emission
is in PA only, up to structural equivalence: when m is def ned in W ≡ W | def fresh m in repl emit〈m〉,
the name m can be chosen outsideN ′, the def nition fresh m is added to DA, and the replicated process
repl emit〈m〉 is added to PA. The reception request may come from PA or from a receiving process, Rx
or R′x .
• The case where the receiving process is in PA is analogous to those for internal reductions
of PA.
• When the receiving process is Rx for some x ∈ L (in P1 only), themessage emit〈m〉 is consumed
and the process Rx is replaced with some other process R in Q1. The reduction uses only the network
def nition in the context, hence we also have
Envx± [Rx | emit〈m〉] → Envx± [ R ]
for any choice of fresh names plug, plugx . By hypothesis, the keys x+, x− do not occur in m (since
by Invariants 4 and 5 they do not occur in PA or W ), so correctness condition 5 implies the expansion
relation:
Envx± [R]  Envx± [Rx | emit〈m〉] .
By applying Lemma 5 to this expansion, we show that R can be replaced with Rx | emit〈m〉 also in
Q1 up to expansion; that is, Q1  P1. To apply the lemma, we choose D′A and P ′A such that def DA in
PA | W ≡ def D′A in P ′A | emit〈m〉 | W and use the following D′′ and P ′′ (D and P in Lemma 5):
D′′ def= ∧z∈X∪L\{x}keys z+, z− ∧ D′A ∧ [[D]]
P ′′ def= P ′A | M◦ | [[T ]] |
∏
z∈X R′z |
∏
z∈L\{x} Rz .
In this case, no reduction on P2 is needed—we can take P ′2 ≡ P2.
• When the receiving process is R′x in Rx for some x in X (in either P1 or P2), by hypothesis the
decryption key x− does not occur in m (since by Invariant 5 it does not occur in PA or W ). Since the
reduction involves only these two processes and the join-pattern emit〈m〉 | recv〈κ〉 in E [ · ], it is enabled
in both P1 and P2, and also corresponds to a reduction
Envx± [R′x | emit〈m〉] → Envx± [R]
for any choice of fresh names plug, plugx . By correctness condition 6, we obtain the expansion relation
Envx± [R]  Envx± [R′′x | Q′′]
for some R′′x ∈ Rx and some process Q′′ with at most the same free names as in emit〈m〉 and R′x
minus x−.
We apply Lemma 5 twice to derive two other expansions Q1  P ′1 and Q2  P ′2. (We rely on expres-
sions D′′ and P ′′ similar to those of the previous case.) We obtain the relations
P1 → Q1  P ′1 ≡R≡ P ′2  Q2 ← P2,
where structural equivalence is used to rearrange the common parts of P ′1 and P
′
2. The new related
processes differ from P1 and P2 on the following points: DA and PA may have been rearranged up
to structural equivalence; the process Q′′ has been added to PA; in case emit〈m〉 was within W , the
two components of a replicated emission def fresh m in repl emit〈m〉 have been added to DA and PA
respectively; otherwise the message emit〈m〉 has been removed from PA.
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The case of a process R′x performing an internal reduction (either in P1 or P2), instead of consuming a
message emit〈m〉, is handled in the same manner, as a special case. (Formally, there are always pending
messages emit〈m〉 issued by the noise generator; any of these messages can be used as described above,
is left unaffected by the reduction, and remains in Q′′.)
Reductions in [[D]] and D: In case the reduction uses a reaction rule in [[D]] or in D, respectively,
this reduction is associated with a particular reduction that uses some rule J 	 U in D to consume the
messages Jσ and trigger the processUσ . We analyze f rst reductions in P1 (relying on translated terms)
and then in P2 (relying on f lters instead).
• A reduction P1 → Q1 uses the join-pattern of the translation of some rule J 	U in D to consume
the process [[J ]]◦σ and trigger the process [[U ]]σ . By def nition of R′, the process [[J ]]◦σ is a parallel
composition of messages that appears in [[M]]◦ and PA. We rearrange M and PA as follows: we let
M ≡ M ′ | M ′′ and PA ≡ def D′A in M ′A | P ′A such that [[J ]]◦σ ≡ [[M ′]]◦ | M ′A and dv[D′A] ∩N ′ = ∅.
After the reduction occurs, we show how to obtain a process of the shape required in the def nition
ofR. Every message that appears in M ′A is of the form x◦〈v˜〉 with x ∈ X . Suppose that x has type 〈τ˜ 〉;
by Assumption 3 on · +, there is a tuple of join-calculus names y˜ in X unionmultiF of types τ˜ such that y˜+ = v˜.
We augment F with the names in y˜ that are not already present in X or F .
In Q1, the triggered process is [[U ]]σ . We build a substitution σ ′ that operates on rv[J ] and such that
[[Uσ ′]] = [[U ]]σ . Every message x◦〈y˜+〉 consumed in the reduction is matched by a message pattern
x◦〈z˜+〉 of [[J ]] and σ is the substitution obtained by composing the substitutions {y˜+/z˜+} for all x in
dv[J ], so we let σ ′ be the substitution obtained by composing the substitutions {y˜/z˜} for all x in dv[J ].
Let P ′1 be the process Q1 where [[Uσ ′]]◦ is substituted for [[Uσ ′]]. We apply Lemma 16 to prove
that Q1  P ′1. To this end, we use the sets of names X ∪ L and F , the join-calculus process P = Uσ ′,
the sjoin-calculus def nition D′ = DA ∧ [[D]], and the sjoin-calculus process Q = PA | [[T ]] | [[M ′′]].
We rely on the Invariants 5, 3, and 4 to satisfy the requirements on names in B−, (B\(X ∪ L))◦, and
(B\(X ∪ L))+ that appear in the statement of Lemma 16.
In P2, after structural rearrangements in DA and PA, we can substitute x〈y˜〉 for every message x◦〈y˜+〉
in M ′A (up to expansion) by applying Lemma 15(1); then move the message x〈y˜〉 from PA to M (up to
structural equivalence). Let P ′2 be the process obtained by composing these relations. We have P2  P ′2,
and there is now a reduction step P ′2 → Q2 that uses the rule J 	 U to substitute the process Uσ ′ for
Jσ ′.
We easily check that P ′1 R P ′2 and, by composing the relations above, we obtain Q1  P ′1 R P ′2 ←
P2; hence Q1  R←∗ P2.
• A reduction P2 → Q2 uses the join-pattern of some rule J 	 U in D to consume messages in
M . As described above for Q1, we can apply Lemma 16 and obtain P1 →  R≡ Q2.
Reductions in [[T ]] and T . These reductions are comparisons: in P2, they replace processes of the
form if x = y then U else U ′ with either U or U ′, while in P1 they replace translated processes of
the form if x+ = y+ then [[U ]] else [[U ′]] with either [[U ]] or [[U ′]]. Since x and y have the same type,
by Assumption 3 on names we obtain that x+ = y+ if and only if x = y, hence that the same branch
is chosen in P1 and P2. As in the previous case, Lemma 16 enables us to substitute [[U ]]◦ for [[U ]] (or
[[U ′]]◦ for [[U ′]]), and the two resulting processes are still related byR.
Reductions using D(X,F). The def nition D(X,F) binds the names y ∈ F , x◦ ∈ X◦, and tσ , t ′σ ∈ T .
Invariant 2 requires that the names in F appear only in D, M , T , and D(X,F), and Invariant 8 forbids
messages sent on names in F in M , so P2 has no reduction that consumes messages sent on names in
F . Invariant 6 requires that the names in T occur only in D(X,F), so P2 has no reduction that involves
the association tables of the f rewall.
Let P2 → Q2 be a reduction that consumes a message x◦〈v˜〉 in PA, for some x ∈ X . In P1 and Q2,
we f rst use structural equivalence as in the cases above to lift any binder on names in v˜ from PA to
DA.
The reduction P2 → Q2 is the f rst reduction of the traversal of the f rewall described in Lemma 15(1),
so Q2  P ′2 for some P ′2 derived from P2 by f rst performing the structural rearrangement described
above, then substituting the message x〈y˜〉 for x◦〈y˜+〉, and f nally moving the message x〈y˜〉 from PA
to M .
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The process P1 can match these structural rearrangements, with no reduction, so we obtain P1 ≡R′
Q2.
Using these lemmas, we establish Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. For a given process P , we choose sets , T , B, and F , and functions · +, · −,
and · ◦ that meet our assumptions on names of Section B.5 and such that P has free names F ⊂ F and
is strongly equivalent to def D in Q where Q is a parallel composition of messages and of comparisons
and where bound names that appear within D and Q are all in B.
Taking X = ∅, L = dv[D], F = fv[P], DA empty, and PA = plug〈emit, recv〉, the seven invariants of
Lemma 17 directly follow from the assumptions on names, so we obtain the observational equivalence:
EL±
[
def [[D]] in plug〈emit, recv〉 | [[Q]]◦ | W |
∏
x∈L
Rx
]
≈ E[ def D(∅,F) ∧ D in plug〈emit, recv〉 | Q | W ].
We write P1 and P2, respectively, for the two processes equated here, and we independently rearrange
them to obtain the statement of the theorem.
• The processes W and plug〈emit, recv〉 do not use the names x+, x−, or x◦ for x ∈ L . By
rearranging the scopes of these names, and by the def nitions of the auxiliary translation [[ · ]]◦ and of
the context Env[ · ], we have the structural equivalence P1 ≡ Env[ [[P]]◦ ].
Applying Lemma 16 for X = ∅, D′ empty, and Q = plug〈emit, recv〉, we obtain the expansion
relation Env[ [[P]] ] Env[ [[P]]◦ ]; thus we have P1 ≡ Env[ [[P]] ].
• On the other side, using the def nition of FF [P] we have
FF [P] def= def D(∅,F) in P ≡ def D(∅,F) ∧ D in Q
(where the structural equivalence rearranges the scopes of names def ned in D, since these names do
not appear in D(∅,F)). By application of the context Env[ · ], we obtain Env[FF [P] ] ≡ P2.
In combination, these relations yield Env[ [[P]] ] ≈ Env[FF [P] ].
The next lemma provides an inverse f rewall GF [ · ] for the f rewall FF [ · ], up to expansion, for a
given choice of names F .
LEMMA 18. For a finite set of names F ⊂ F, we define the context:
GF [ · ] def= def
∧
x∈F
keys x+, x− ∧ D(F,∅) in
∏
x∈F
Rx | [ · ].
For every join-calculus process P such that fv[P] ⊆ F, we have the expansion relations:
E[GF [FF [P]] | W ]  P (1)
Env[GF [FF [P]] ]  Env[ P ]. (2)
Lemma 19 states that both translations are fully abstract for all transitive relations coarser than obser-
vational equivalence and closed by application of evaluation contexts. This lemma implies Theorems 2
and 4.
LEMMA 19. Let R be a transitive relation on sjoin-calculus processes that is closed by application
of evaluation contexts and such that ≈ ⊆ R. For all join-calculus processes P and Q, for all finite sets
F of names with fv[P] ∪ fv[Q] ⊆ F,
1. P R Q if and only if Env[FF [P]] R Env[FF [Q]],
2. P R Q if and only if Env[[[P]]] R Env[[[Q]]].
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Proof. We f rst prove statement (1). Since Env[FF [ · ]] is an evaluation context, if P R Q, then
Env[FF [P]] R Env[FF [Q]]. In order to establish the converse, we use the evaluation context
DF [ · ] def= def
∧
x∈F keys x+, x−
∧ plug〈emit, recv〉 	 (def D(F,∅) in ∏x∈F Rx) in [ · ].
For every join-calculus process T such that fv[T ] ⊆ F , we have the relations
DF [Env[FF [T ] ]] ≡ DF [E [plug〈emit, recv〉] |FF [T ] | W ]
→∼ EF
[(
def D(F,∅) in
∏
x∈F
Rx
)
|FF [T ] | W
]
≡ E[GF [FF [T ] | W ] ].
By applying the special case of Lemma 3, it is straightforward to prove the expansion relation DF
[Env[FF [T ]]] E[GF [FF [T ]] | W ]. Besides, by Lemma 18, we have another expansion relation
E[GF [FF [T ]] | W ] T .
If Env[FF [P] ] R Env[FF [Q] ] then, sinceR is closed by application of evaluation contexts, we
have DF [Env[FF [P] ]] R DF [Env[FF [Q] ]]. By composingR and the expansions above with P and
Q substituted for T , we obtain P R  Q, so P RRR Q and P R Q.
Statement (2) of the lemma is a corollary of statement (1) in combination with Theorem 3.
B.6. Compositionality of the Filtering Translation
Finally, we prove Theorem 6 as a corollary of the results proved above. Theorem 5 immediately
follows from Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. We make use of a “+” operator on def nitions in the join-calculus: to every
def nition D = ∧k Jk 	 Pk and message ρ〈y˜〉 such that the names ρ, y˜ do not appear in any Jk , we
associate the def nition D + ρ〈y˜〉 def= ∧k(Jk | ρ〈y˜〉) 	 (Pk | ρ〈y˜〉). Provided that ρ ∈ fv[D] ∪ fv[P], we
have the strong equivalence def D in P ∼ def D + ρ〈y˜〉 in P | ρ〈y˜〉.
We adopt the same hypotheses and naming conventions as in Section B.5. In the statement of
Theorem 6, let P = def ∧ni=1 Di in ∏ni=1 Qi in the join-calculus, and let S be a f nite set of names
such that fv[P] ⊆ S. For i = 1 . . . n, we choose tuples x˜ i and x˜ i that contain the names in the sets Xi
and Xi , respectively, and also names ρi , si , zi ∈ B that are not free in Di , Qi , or S. We let
Dr
def=
n∏
i=1
zi 〈x˜ i , si 〉 	
n∏
i=1
si 〈x˜ i 〉
D′i
def= (Di + ρi 〈x˜ i 〉) ∧ (si 〈x˜ i 〉 	 ρi 〈x˜ i 〉 | Qi )
P ′i
def= def D′i in zi 〈x˜ i , si 〉
P ′ def= def Dr in
n∏
i=1
P ′i .
Thus, P ′ differs from P because the n components P ′i do not initially share names and instead exchange
names through the def nition Dr , before behaving like the original components of P .
Next, we establish the equivalence P ≈ P ′. In P ′, the reduction that consumes themessages zi 〈x˜ i , si 〉
and triggers the messages si 〈x˜ i 〉 is deterministic; then the n reductions that consume the messages si 〈x˜ i 〉
and trigger the processes ρi 〈x˜ i 〉 | Qi are also deterministic. Finally, the names zi and si do not appear
any more except in their def nitions, so they can be discarded up to strong equivalence, and we obtain
P by composing n strong equivalences def Di + ρi 〈x˜ i 〉 in Qi | ρi 〈x˜ i 〉 ∼ def Di in Qi .
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We transfer this equivalence to the sjoin-calculus. We have the following series of relations:
Env[FS[P] ] ≈ Env[FS[P ′] ] (1)
≈ Env[ [[P ′]] ] (2)
≡ Env z˜±
[
def [[Dr ]] in
n∏
i=1
(Rzi | [[P ′i ]])
]
(3)
≈ Env z˜±
[
def [[Dr ]] in
n∏
i=1
(
Rzi
∣∣FS∪{zi }[P ′i ])
]
(4)
≡ Env z˜±
[
def [[Dr ]] in
n∏
i=1
(
Rzi
∣∣F∅S∪{zi }[D′i , zi 〈x˜ i , si 〉])
]
(5)
 EnvX±,s˜±,z˜±
[
def [[Dr ]] in
n∏
i=1
(
Rzi
∣∣∣ Ezi [x˜+i , s+i ] ∣∣∣F Xi ∪{si }S∪{zi } [D′i ,0])
]
(6)
 EnvX±,s˜±,z˜±
[
def [[Dr ]] in
n∏
i=1
(
Rzi
∣∣∣ z◦i 〈x˜+i , s+i 〉 ∣∣∣F Xi ∪{si }S∪{zi } [D′i ,0])
]
(7)
 EnvX±,s˜±,z˜±
[
def [[Dr ]] in
n∏
i=1
(
Rzi
∣∣ Esi [x˜ i +] ∣∣F Xi ∪{si }S∪{zi } [D′i ,0])
]
(8)
 EnvX±,s˜±
[
n∏
i=1
(
Esi [x˜
i +]
∣∣F Xi ∪{si }S [D′i ,0])
]
(9)
 EnvX±,s˜±
[
n∏
i=1
F Xi ∪{si }S [D′i ,s◦i 〈x˜ i +〉]
]
(10)
 EnvX±,s˜±
[
n∏
i=1
F Xi ∪{si }S∪Xi [D′i ,si 〈x˜ i 〉]
]
(11)
≈ EnvX±,s˜±
[
n∏
i=1
F Xi ∪{si }S∪Xi [Di , Qi ]
]
(12)
 EnvX±
[
n∏
i=1
F XiS∪Xi [Di , Qi ]
]
. (13)
The equivalence (1) is the join-calculus equivalence P ≈ P ′ in the evaluation context Env[FS[ · ] ].
The equivalence (2) is Theorem 3 applied to P ′. The structural rearrangement (3) follows from the
def nitions of P ′ and of the compositional translation [[ · ]]. The equivalence (4) is obtained by com-
posing n applications of Theorem 2 for each process P ′i in combination with Lemma 5. The struc-
tural rearrangement (5) follows from the def nitions of the f rewall contexts F [ · ] and F [ · , ·]. The
expansion (6) accounts for the traversals of the i th f rewall for every message s◦i 〈x˜ i +〉; it uses n times
Lemma 15(2). The expansion (7) is composed of n runs of the secure communication protocol on
z1, . . . , zn , as described by correctness condition 4 on the protocol, in combination with Lemma 5. The
expansion (8) stands for the deterministic reduction that uses the join-pattern of [[Dr ]], consumes the
process
∏n
i=1 zi 〈x˜ i , si 〉 and produces the process [[
∏n
i=1 si 〈x˜ i 〉]] =
∏n
i=1 [[si 〈x˜ i 〉]] =
∏n
i=1 Esi [x˜ i +].
The expansion (9) garbage-collects the names zi , in three stages: (a) since zi occurs only in the def -
nition Dzi 	Ezi in the i th f rewall, we can discard this def nition and the entry (zi , z
+
i ) from the single
association table where it appears, up to strong equivalence; (b) since z+i and z
−
i occur only in Rzi , we
can substitute 0 for Rzi up to expansion, by correctness condition 5; (c) the names z◦i occur only in [[Dr ]];
the names z+i and z
−
i occur only in their def nitions keys z
+
i , z
−
i in EnvX±,s˜±,z˜± [ · ]; these def nitions
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can be discarded up to strong equivalences. The expansion (10) is composed of n runs of the secure
communication protocol on s1, . . . , sn , as described by correctness condition 4 on the protocol, with
Lemma 5. The expansion (11) accounts for the traversals of the f rewalls for every message si 〈x˜ i 〉; it
uses Lemma 15(1) n times. The equivalence (12) is the composition, for i = 1, . . . , n, of a deterministic
reduction that consumes the message si 〈x˜ i 〉 and of a strong equivalence that discards +ρi 〈x˜ i 〉. Finally,
the expansion (13) garbage-collects the names si , much as in step (9).
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